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INTRODUCTION
Mercenary activity has not declined since the end of the Cold War. On
the contrary, the international black market of military services is flourish-
ing. While Cold War counterinsurgencies and covert actions were fought by
shadowy commandos with suspicious connections to the Pentagon, current
low-intensity conflicts are fought by mercenaries with impeccable resumes
who negotiate contracts openly and give interviews to the press. A number
of different explanations have been offered for this increased mercenary ac-
tivity, including the spread of armed conflicts associated with the formation
of new States,' and the sale of military services by detachments of national
' B.A., University of California at Berkeley, 1985; Ph.D., Yale University, 1994; J.D., Har-
vard Law School, 1997. The initial research for this project was conducted at Human Rights
Watch Arms Project as an Everett Fellow. The views expressed by the author herein are not
necessarily shared by either Human Rights Watch or the Everett Foundation. The author
wishes to thank Joost Hilterman at Human Rights Watch, and Professor Duncan Kennedy and
Professor Abraham Chayes at Harvard Law School for their comments and suggestions. The
author especially wishes to thank Captain Sean Sapone (US Army).
1. According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Enrique Ber-
nales Ballesteros:
In practice what is happening is that a process of international restructuring has
begun in which the end of bipolarity has left exposed and vulnerable areas for-
merly in liege to one of the two axes of world power. The disappearance of deci-
sive ideological influence, the cutting-off of economic assistance and the with-
drawal of military control forces have given rise, almost naturally, to complex
processes of rearrangement and transition ....
Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and
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armies in order to pay their members and avert dissolution.2 Worldwide
military downsizing may have encouraged former career military personnel
to view "any armed conflict [as] an opportunity to become involved in ex-
change for pay."'3 Or, as one mercenary explained, "this might be our only
chance to see an honest-to-God shooting war on the European continent in
our lifetime and dammit, we were not going to miss it."4
The form of mercenary activity has also changed over the past twenty
years. Mercenary soldiers are now often acting as "trainers" and "advisors"
to armies that have contracted for their martial services. A number of pri-
vate companies, such as Executive Outcomes (South Africa) and Military
Professional Resources, Inc. (USA), bid for overseas military assistance
contracts with the knowledge of their respective governments. Occasionally,
such consultant mercenaries execute the foreign policy aims of their gov-
ernments, allowing the governments to eschew responsibility for politically
sensitive covert operations. But just as often these military consultant or-
ganizations pursue their own private economic ends. Most of the personnel
of these private military organizations are former high-level retired military
officers with extensive contacts within the defense community.5
While States have been the most common employers of mercenary
forces, insurgent and opposition groups are now commonly using mercenar-
ies. Foreign mercenaries have been or are being used by opposition groups
in Chechnya,6 Tajikistan,7 Azerbaijan,8 Georgia,9 Kashmir, ° Sierra Leone,"
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N. ESCOR, 50th
Sess. at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/23 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Report on the Question of
the Use of Mercenaries].
2. See id. at 16.
3. Id. at 44. Many of the mercenaries who were hired by the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) enlisted after being laid off by the South African Defense
Force (SADF). See Al J. Venter, Merc Work: Angola: Hired Guns Fight on Both Sides in
Endless Civil War, SOLDIER FORTUNE, Aug. 1993, at 34.
4. Rob Krott, Looking for War in All the Wrong Places, SOLDIER FORTUNE, Sept. 1992,
at 57. Another mercenary claimed simply that he "abhorred the idea of a humdrum exis-
tence." PETER TICKLER, THE MODERN MERCENARY 128 (1987).
5. See Stan Crock, Trouble is Our Business, Bus. WK., Nov. 20, 1995, at 52.
6. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said that Russian, Ukrainian, Baltic, and
Middle Eastern mercenaries were among the 400 killed in the fighting for Bamut on May 23,
1996. See Some 2,000 Mercenaries Fighting in Chechnya, ITAR-TASS, May 25, 1996,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Tass File.
7. See 1994 Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries, supra note 1, at 35-36.
8. See id. at 26-28.
9. See id. at 29-30.
10. See India's Secret Army in Kashmir, (Hum. Rts. Watch, New York, N.Y.), May
1996. On June 7, 1996, Indian Army troops killed four non-Kashmiri combatants, including a
Chechen, in Arizal, Kashmir. See Chechen Among Four Mercenaries Killed in Indian Kash-
mir, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, June 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3866998.
II. See Jim Hooper, Peace in Sierra Leone: A Temporary Outcome?, JANE'S
INTELLIGENCE REV., Feb. 2, 1997, at 91, available in 1997 WL 2006699:
In June 1996, Sankoh hired at least two Belgian mercenaries whose presence in
2
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1 [1999], Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol30/iss1/10
1999] THE GLOBAL ECONOMY OF MERCENARY VIOLENCE 3
Zaire, 2 and East Timor and Papua New Guinea.'3
Mercenary activity no longer takes place solely in the context of armed
conflict. Mercenaries are now joining organizations of arms dealers, smug-
glers, or drug-traffickers, forming criminal rather than purely military asso-
ciations. 4 These criminal associations may hire themselves out for any
number of illicit purposes, not necessarily involving armed conflict.
Nor is it unusual for these illegal groups to exchange identities; a terrorist
group might also be said to be composed of mercenaries when it moves to
the territory of another State in order to provide protection to drug traf-
fickers in exchange for payment, engage in sabotage... or take part in a
domestic armed conflict. 15
The participation of mercenaries in armed conflicts has not been harm-
less. Irregular paramilitary units are known to have been involved in massa-
cres, executions, looting, and rape in a number of recent conflicts.' 6 Because
mercenaries are often not part of the hierarchical command structure of
regular military forces, lack ethnic or cultural connections to the civilian
populations, and were often discharged from prior military service because
of disciplinary problems, mercenaries may be more likely than regular sol-
diers to engage in systematic human rights abuses and violations of the laws
of war.'7 According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Enrique
Bernales Ballesteros, the presence of mercenaries "is a factor which tends to
Sierra Leone was discovered through radio intercepts the day they crossed the
border from Guinea. Using the noms de guerre "Henri" and "Michael", they were
apparently air defence specialists tasked with either training the RUF [Revolution-
ary United Front] or shooting down EO's [Executive Outcomes] helicopters them-
selves.
Id.
12. See William Wallis, Mercenaries Train Soldiers in Zaire, Sources Say, REUTERS,
Jan. 8, 1997. According to Zairian Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo's spokesman, Sombo
Dibele: "I have no knowledge of this presence of mercenaries. The only mercenaries I know
of operating on Zairean soil are fighting with (rebel leader) Laurent Kabila." Id.
13. Allan Hetherington-Cleverly, a British mercenary, worked with the East Timor resis-
tance groups and with the Free Papua Movement (OPM). After the OPM seized 26 hostages
in January 1996 in Mapnduma, Irian Jaya, Hetherington-Cleverly was asked by the OPM to
intervene. See British Mercenary Asked to Help Free Hostages: Report, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE,
Mar. 8, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3818405. On May 15, Indonesian special forces freed
the hostages. See Irian Hostages Rescued, PhrrsBURGH POST-GAZZATrE, May 16, 1996, at
A8.
14. See 1994 Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries, supra note 1, at 41.
15. Id. at 44.
16. Unarmed Bosnian-Croat civilians were massacred in Maljine and Doljani on June 8,
and 27-28, 1993 by irregular units of foreigners calling themselves "mujahidin," and operat-
ing in conjunction with the 7th Brigade of the army of Bosnia and Herzogovina. Id. at 26.
17. For example, a 22-year-old Swedish mercenary was sentenced to 13 years in prison
for war crimes at Capljina prisoner of war camp in Bosnia in September 1995. See Bosnia
Jails Swede for War Crimes, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Sept. 9, 1995, available in 1995 WL
7854273. The Swede had served with the French Foreign Legion before joining Bosnian
Croat troops in 1993. See id.
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increase the violent and cruel nature of specific aspects of the conflict in
which they are involved."" The presence of mercenaries may extend the du-
ration of the conflict. According to the Special Rapporteur, "financial con-
siderations and the desire for illicit gain through looting which is associated
with the participation of mercenaries may be of crucial importance in ex-
tending the conflict."' 9 Furthermore, because the business of mercenaries is
war, they have no incentive to encourage the peaceful resolution of the con-
flict.
Over the past few decades, mercenaries have received considerable at-
tention. Human rights non-governmental organizations have taken an inter-
est in the mercenary's role in violations of the laws of war. The "problem"
of mercenaries has inspired a number of law review articles concerned with
the inadequacies of the current legal regime.20 This article asks a different
question: Why are mercenaries so objectionable to governments, human
rights organizations, international lawyers,2 and certain journalists? Why is
there a substantial body of public international law (including treaties, con-
ventions, protocols, and United Nations resolutions)22 geared at outlawing,
in name if not in fact, mercenaries? Why do so many countries also have
18. 1994 Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries, supra note 1, at 13.
19. Id. at 14.
20. For example, see James L. Taulbee, Myths, Mercenaries and Contemporary Interna-
tional Law, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 339, 343 (1985); Note, American Mercenaries and the
Neutrality Act: Shortening the Leash on the Dogs of War, 12 J. LEGiS. 175, 183 (1985); Le-
nox Hinds, The Legal Status of Mercenaries: A Concept in International Humanitarian Law,
52 P-mLA. L.J. 395, 408 (1977); Allaoua Layeb, Mercenary Activity: United States Neutrality
Laws and Enforcement, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 269, 281 (1989).
21. According to Chief R.O.A. Akinjide of the International Law Commission: "In Af-
rica, the mercenary is seen as the representative of colonialism and of racial oppression-an
assassin hired to kill freedom-fighters in wars of national liberation and wars against racial
oppression." Chief R.O.A. Akinjide, Mercenarism and International Law, Address at the In-
ternational Law Seminar, Geneva, Switz. (May 27, 1995).
22. The United Nations has passed a number of resolutions condemning the recruitment
and use of mercenaries in specific conflicts, and calling on States to enact legislation. Resolu-
tion No. 3103 reaffirmed Resolutions 2548 (XXIV) of December 11, 1969 and Resolution
2727 (XXV) of December 14, 1970, declaring that using mercenaries against national libera-
tion movements was a criminal act. In Resolution 3103, the U.N. General Assembly declared
that "the practice of using mercenaries against national liberation movements in the colonial
Territories constitutes a criminal act .. " Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Com-
batants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, G.A. Res.
3101, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., C.6 Supp. No. 30, at 142-43, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974). Pre-
sumably, mercenaries fighting on behalf of national liberation movements are not criminals.
See L.C. Green, The Status of Mercenaries in International Law, 9 MAN. L. REV. 201, 230-
31 (1979). The Security Council also called upon "all states to exercise the utmost vigilance
against the danger posed by international mercenaries." S.C. Res. 405, U.N. SCOR Res &
Dec., 32nd Sess., at 18, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977). General Assembly Resolution 3314,
which amended the U.N. Charter's definition of aggression, provides that, regardless of a
declaration of war, sending "armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out
acts of armed force against another State" constitutes an act of aggression. Definition of Ag-
gression, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142-43, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974).
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domestic legislation proscribing the use of mercenaries? And yet why are
mercenaries so appealing to adolescent boys, readers of Soldier of Fortune,
and many U.S. Army soldiers?
This article explores why and how a distaste for mercenaries came to
exist and why this aversion to mercenaries has become reified in legal
forms. It begins with the proposition that military labor circulates as a
commodity in an international market. It is a "contested commodity" to the
degree States cannot control it.23 The commodification of mercenary vio-
lence appears illegitimate when contrasted with "appropriate" State vio-
lence. Yet, military knowledge was not always a commodity contested by
States. Historically, military skill was fully alienable in the international
market.2 States did not "monopolize" military violence, but only "captured"
or exploited it. The slow process by which the State monopolized the use of
force suggests that military institutions have no natural or dependent rela-
tionship to the State, but may exist autonomously from it. Indeed, current
mercenary participants in the international military marketplace continue to
operate outside of States, as externalities of the State system. To control this
blackmarket military economy, States have restricted the sale of individual
military know-how through the codification of domestic neutrality laws and
have regulated the international marketplace of military labor through inter-
national conventions. In conclusion, this article suggests a connection be-
tween partial commodification of private military labor and the global
economy of violence.
I. MILITARY VIOLENCE AS A CONTESTED COMMODITY
Military labor and knowledge circulate as commodities to be bought
and sold on the world market. Military skill--essentially the management
and deployment of violence-is a contested commodity. The predominant
cultural view, reflected in legal and ideological prohibitions, is that military
skill should not be bought and sold, that it should not be conceived of or
treated as a commodity. It is viewed as "noncommodifiable." "When some-
thing is noncommodifiable, market trading is a disallowed form of social
organization and allocation. 25 From the perspective of the State, mercenar-
ies, like hit-men and prostitutes, engage in a prohibited commodification of
"things" which should not in theory be marketable. Mercenary activity puts
23. Much of the discussion on commodification was inspired by MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996). Dr. Margaret Jane Radin is the Wm. Benjamin
Scott and Luna M. Scott Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, where she is also Co-
Director of the Program in Law, Science, and Technology. Radin is a noted property theorist,
who has written extensively about "commodification," exploring the limits of markets and
market rhetoric.
24. Much of the discussion on the history of prohibition of mercenaries is based on
JANICE E. THOMPSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES, AND SOVEREIGNS: STATE-BUILDING AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE (1994).
25. RADIN, supra note 23, at 20.
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military knowledge and technique back into the marketplace.
But why is the commodification of military skill so objectionable? The
"problem" of mercenaries becomes apparent when their commodification of
violence is contrasted with the non-market military ideology of State vio-
lence.26 The unauthorized, externally deployed violence of mercenaries is
structurally opposed to the legitimate, organized State violence of the armed
forces. The State ideology of the use of military force is the preeminent cul-
tural construction of "appropriate" violence. In the United States, it is taken
for granted that the military serves the State, that military knowledge is or
should be outside of the marketplace, and that soldiers have a unique, non-
transferable competence in organized, systematic killing. Mercenaries, on
the other hand, have little loyalty to any State. Both their violence and mili-
tary knowledge are commodified and alienable within the marketplace, and
their military skills are transferable. According to the State-oriented hege-
monic view, mercenaries defy military norms and thus lack moral legiti-
macy.
The armed forces of the United States, like other military entities, pro-
mote a particular ethical world-view. While this perspective may differ be-
tween units, between officers and enlisted men, and between branches of the
armed services, Vice Admiral James Stockdale provides a pithy summary of
the military world-view: "The military ethos is or should be one of duty, in-
dividual sacrifice, and group dedication. The traditional virtues of the mili-
tary calling are loyalty, obedience, and courage. '"27
This statement displays a number of the fundamental underpinnings of
State military ideology. First, it assumes that the military exists to serve the
State.2" According to this view, military officers engage in the "management
of violence" to ensure "the military security of his client, society., 29 The
service that the military ostensibly provides is the defense of the polis. Mili-
tary rhetoric reinforces the notion that becoming a member of the armed
forces "whether through enlistment or induction, involves a commitment to
the United States, the service, and one's fellow citizens and servicemem-
bers .... .30 The military thereby connects itself to a political community;
military service is sometimes viewed as an aspect of the rights and duties of
citizenship.3 Individual members of the armed forces may be called upon to
sacrifice their lives so that the political community will continue to exist.
26. For a general theory of State ideology as manifested in official discourse, see FRANK
BURTON, OFFICIAL DISCOURSE: ON DISCOURSE, ANALYSIS, GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS,
IDEOLOGY, AND THE STATE (1979).
27. RICHARD GABRIEL, To SERVE WITH HONOR: A TREATISE ON MILITARY ETHICS AND
THE WAY OF THE SOLDIER xiv (1982).
28. See Sir John Withrop Hackett, The Military in the Service of the State, in WAR,
MORALITY, AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION 110, 110 (Malham W. Wakin ed., 1979).
29. SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND POLITICS OF
CIVIL-MLTARY RELATIONS 19 (1957).
30. 32 C.F.R. § 41.3(b)(1) (1998).
31. See MORRIS JANOWITZ, MILITARY CONFLICT 70-88 (1975).
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The military demands this "sacrifice of the lives of its members in pursuit of
the community's right to self-defense."32
Among soldiers, this ethos of service is unchallenged--every soldier is
thoroughly indoctrinated to believe that she is performing a duty to her
country. When asked why they serve, few soldiers will answer that it is be-
cause they enjoy killing or blowing things up. Even when this is the case,
the public acknowledgment of a secondary motivation would feel inappro-
priate. It would expose the secret at the heart of military ideology-that the
rhetoric of military service conceals the ecstasy of violence.
Mercenaries may "serve" a State by offering their services for pay, yet
they are disconnected from any political community. They make no perma-
nent commitment to a government, nor do they perform a sacrificial service
for their fellow citizens. For mercenaries, military activity is wholly unre-
lated to the duties or privileges of citizenship. Mercenary violence is not
cloaked in a rhetoric of service and sacrifice to a State or political commu-
nity. From the perspective of the State, mercenary violence is violence for
it's own sake.
Despite the service rhetoric surrounding State armies, it would be a
gross oversimplification to conclude that the connection of the State armed
forces to civil society is unproblematic. States, including the United States,
often have a strained, tenuous relationship with their armed forces. Al-
though the military allegedly exists to serve the State, the State isolates the
military instrument from civilian society. The military is dangerous and
liminal and must be quarantined, restricted. This structural relationship, cre-
ating an opposition and separation between civil society and the armed
forces, is established in the U.S. Constitution. Article II, section 2, identifies
the President as Commander-in-Chief, placing ultimate authority over the
military in the hands of a civilian.33 Article I, section 8, gives Congress the
power to declare war and to raise and support armies, assuring that war is
undertaken with the consent of the political community.'
Although these Constitutional provisions ensure civilian control of the
armed forces, in the United States, the military is accorded a high degree of
deference and is treated as distinct from civil society. The Code of Federal
Regulations, which governs the armed forces, specifies that "military ser-
vice is a calling different from any civilian occupation. '3 Similarly, as the
U.S. Supreme Court noted in Parker v. Levy:36
This Court has long recognized that the military is, by necessity, a special-
ized society separate from civilian society.... [It has] developed laws and
traditions of its [own] .... "An army is not a deliberative body.... No
32. HUNTINGTON, supra note 29, at 19.
33. U.S. CONST. art. il, § 2.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
35. 32 C.F.R. § 41.3(b) (1998).
36. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
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question can be left open as to the right to command in the officer, or the
duty of obedience in the soldier".....
The segregation of the military instrument from civil society, and the cur-
rent of anxiety that underlies this relationship, is an atavistic reminder of
military entities' existence outside of (and potentially in opposition to) the
State. 38
Second, as the Stockdale quote above indicates, the military sees itself
as fundamentally outside of the marketplace. War is, and should not be a
business. In part, this distinction is necessary because the tasks of military
and business entities are simply different. "Military systems, especially the
small unit subsystems that are expected to bear the burden of killing, are
categorically unlike anything in the business world."39 However, at a deeper
level, the logic of war and the logic of capitalism are fundamentally op-
posed. "Econometric models do not work on the battlefield; death in combat
is always an uneconomic, irrational decision for the one who is doing the
dying."' For many, the Vietnam War exemplifies the erroneous attempt to
treat war as a business, the success of which could be quantified in a body-
count. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara "tried to run the Vietnam con-
flict as if it were the Ford Motor Company . . . ."" Transplanting business
ethics and ideas into a military situation was perceived as dangerous. "The
military's loss of some of its traditional values and their replacement with
the values of the economic marketplace can lead to the abandonment of
ethical precepts ... to the point that combat effectiveness itself is ef-
fected."4 2
Mercenaries challenge this ideological system by making war a busi-
ness. They challenge the exclusion of military skills from the marketplace
by engaging in the management and deployment of violence for pay. In
some sense they also explode the simplistic anti-economic construction of
warfare because as all defense contractors know, armed conflict is profit-
able.
The third element of hegemonic State military ideology is the military
profession's claim to a unique competence in the technique and technology
of killing. The expertise and knowledge necessary to carry out the system-
atic application of violence on behalf of the State requires extensive training
and education. 'The techniques of the military profession are not widely
available and, in point of fact, can only be legitimately acquired and prac-
37. Id. at 743-44 (quoting in part In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890)).
38. See discussion infra Part II1.
39. RICHARD A. GABRIEL & PAUL L. SAVAGE, CRISIS IN COMMAND: MISMANAGEMENT IN
THE ARMY 61 (1978).
40. Id. at 95.
41. GABRIEL, supra note 27, at xv (quoting Vice-Admiral James Stockdale, USN (re-
tired)).
42. Id. at 58.
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ticed within the confines of the profession itself."43 Thus, knowledge is re-
stricted and its commodification outside of the confines of the "profession"
is prohibited. "The officer is not a mercenary who transfers his services
wherever they are best rewarded . "..."I The military has a monopoly on the
skills associated with warfighting. The skills, particularly those associated
with combat operations, are not legitimately transferable to other employers
either military or civilian. Soldiers cannot simply decide to switch armies;
the ideology of patriotism and loyalty prevents the skill from entering the
marketplace. "[Olnce a soldier leaves the military he is outside the brother-
hood forever. Technically, one could become a soldier of fortune, but still
one would no longer be part of a profession per se."45
The competence of mercenaries in the profession of arms destroys the
professional soldier's claim to a unique skill. Mercenaries, most of whom
are former soldiers, "steal" the military training and education provided by
States and practice these acquired skills outside the profession. By practic-
ing their killing trade outside of the confines of the State military system,
mercenaries violate the concept of a "military profession." They are equally
as professional, and perhaps more so, because their motivation is financial
rather than ideological.
The fourth element of State military ideology requires that the military
officer remain politically neutral yet loyal to the nation-State and the profes-
sion. Politics should not intrude on military decision making; political con-
siderations should be hammered out at the policy-making stage. 'The most
effective forces and the most competent officer corps are those which are
motivated by ideals rather than by political or ideological aims." 6 The fun-
damental nature of military professionalism is not political loyalty, but loy-
alty to a particular ideology of service. Samuel Huntington, in The Soldier
and the State, first articulated the now common view that officers are pro-
fessionals whose loyalty should be to the profession.4" Individual careerism
and financial advancement are a form of self-interest damaging to the mili-
tary service ethos.' "The military quality of the professional is independent
of the cause for which he fights."'49 Of course, the same might be said for
43. Id. at 84.
44. Samuel Huntington, Officership as a Profession, in WAR, MORALITY, AND THE
MILITARY PROFESSION, supra note 28, at 19.
45. GABRIEL, supra note 27, at 87.
46. HUNTINGTON, supra note 29, at 40.
47. See id. at 29. Samuel P. Huntington is currently the Albert J. Weatherhead III Uni-
versity Professor at Harvard, the Director of the Olin Institute, and Chairman of the Harvard
Academy for International and Area Studies. His most recent book is THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).
48. See Philip M. Flammer, Conflicting Loyalties and the American Military Ethic, in
WAR, MORALITY, AND THE MILITARY PROFESSION, supra note 28, at 163, 167-68. As in any
profession, many officers are self-centered careerists. The ideological structure of the military
ethic, however, delegitimizes careerist ambitions.
49. HUNTINGTON, supra note 29, at 40.
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mercenaries.
This brief discussion sketches the ideological backbone of the State's
monopoly on violence and indicates how mercenaries challenge the State's
ideological structures. It partially answers the question of why mercenaries
are dangerous enough to States to be prohibited from comnnodification. The
question arises, how did States delegitimize mercenaries? How did States
come to monopolize the use of force, to claim ownership and control of it,
and to prevent its market alienation by private actors?
II. THE UNNATURAL RELATION OF VIOLENCE AND THE STATE
It is commonly assumed by legal scholars and political theorists that the
State holds a monopoly on the use of force, and that States alone have the
power to make war. Max Weber, 0 for example, identified the State as that
entity which "successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force in the enforcement of its order."51 Charles Tilly52 also
saw the State as "controlling the principal means of coercion within a given
territory. .. .,51 More recently, Anthony Giddens54 defined the nation-State
as having "direct control of the means of internal and external violence...
[within] a territory demarcated by boundaries (borders). 55
While the State may hold a monopoly on the use of force, there is noth-
ing natural about this arrangement. Until the mid-nineteenth century, mili-
tary knowledge and labor were an alienable commodity in an international
market. Sovereignty bore little or no relation to the control of organized vio-
lence.56 States have not always controlled the deployment of extra-territorial
50. Max Weber, considered by many to be a founder of sociology, is best known for his
work on religion and economics. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE
SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1905).
51. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 154 (A.M.
Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1947).
52. Charles Tilly's work focuses on large-scale social change and its relationship to con-
tentious politics, especially in Western Europe since 1500. Currently he is the Joseph L. But-
tenwieser Professor of Social Science at Columbia University. His work includes BIG
STRUCTURES, LARGE PROCESSES, HUGE COMPARISONS (1984); COERCION, CAPITAL AND
EUROPEAN STATES A.D. 990-1990 (1990); EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS, 1492-1992 (1993).
53. Charles Tilly, Theories of Political Transformation, in THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL
STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE 638 (Charles Tilly ed., 1975).
54. Anthony Giddens, currently the Director of the London School of Economics and
Political Science (LSE), is well known for his writing in the areas of sociology, politics, and
social theory.
55. ANTHONY GIDDENS, 2 A CONTEMPORARY CRmQUE OF HISTORICAL MATERIALISM,
121 (1985).
56. See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 3:
The contemporary organization of global violence is neither timeless nor natural.
It is distinctively modem. In the six centuries leading up to 1900, global violence
was democratized, marketized, and internationalized. Nonstate violence dominated
the international system. Individuals and groups used their own means of violence
in pursuit of their particular aims, whether honor and glory, wealth, or political
10
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violence. Between the period of 1300 and 1900, privateers, mercantile com-
panies, and mercenaries were fixtures of the international system. Military
manpower was a commodity to be bought and sold in the marketplace. The
use of mercenaries remained a legitimate State practice for about three cen-
turies. "Long before absolute monarchy arose, soldiers offering themselves
for hire had constituted a major export trade of the Middle Ages, and one of
the first to establish a European market."57 Between 1300 and 1450, Free
Companies composed of ragged groups of soldiers flourished in Europe.
Foreign mercenaries were common in Renaissance Italy.5" Charles VII of
France in 1445 integrated mercenaries into his standing army or when nec-
essary, simply bought army units.59 During the eighteenth century most
European States utilized foreign mercenaries as troops.' During the U.S.
War of Independence, for example, Britain used 18,000 Hessian mercenar-
ies. 61
Organized, systematic violence has no "natural" relation to the State,
but has an independent existence as an externality of the State. Gilles
Deleuze62 and Felix Guattari63 have advanced the theory that military or-
ganization is not indigenous to the State, but pre-exists it.' Indeed, the an-
power. People bought and sold military manpower like a commodity on the global
market. The identity of the suppliers or purchasers meant almost nothing.
Id.
57. V.G. Kiernan, Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy, in CRISIS IN EUROPE,
1560-1660, at 121 (Trevor Aston ed., 1965).
58. See ANTHONY MOCKLER, THE NEw MERCENARIES 7 (1987).
59. See id. at 14.
60. See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 61-68.
61. See MOCKLER, supra note 58, at 5. The use of Hessian mercenaries was, in fact, an
unparalled disaster. The Hessian mercenaries surrendered en masse at the battles of Trenton
and Saratoga Springs and over 5000 mercenaries deserted to join the growing ranks of Ger-
man settlers. See id. For a history of Hessian mercenaries see CHARLES W. INGRAO, THE
HESSIAN MERCENARY STATE: IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND REFORM UNDER FREDERICK II, 1760-
1785 (1982).
62. Although Gilles Deleuze's work has received little critical attention outside of
France, his writing in the areas of critical philosophy and "unconventional" literary criticism
is considered by many scholars to be among the best of the twentieth century. See JOHN
LECHTE, ROUTLEDGE, FIFTY KEY CONTEMPORARY THINKERS (1994). Deleuze's most notewor-
thy works include DIFFERENCE AND REPETITION (Paul Patton trans., 1995) and ESSAYS
CRITICAL AND CLINICAL (Daniel Smith & Michael Greco trans., 1997).
63. Fdlix Guattari, a Lacanian psychoanalyst, and Deleuze co-authored two volumes of
CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA: ANTI-OEDIPUS (1985) and A THOUSAND PLATEAUS:
CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA (Brian Massumi trans., 1992). Their basic thesis is that capi-
talism is a schizophrenic system insofar as it profits from the individual by subverting territo-
rial groupings such as the church and the family, yet produces reterritorializations of new so-
cial forms in order to function. For a basic explanation and overview of their influential
social theory, see CHARLES J. STIVALE, THE Two-FoLD THOUGHT OF DELEUZE AND GUATTARI:
INTERSECTIONS AND ANIMATIONS (1998).
64. See Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari, Treatise on Nomadology: -The War Machine,
in A THOUSAND PLATEAUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 352 (Brian Massumi trans.,
1992). Deleuze and Guattari theorize the existence of a "war machine" which is "irreducible
to the State apparatus .... outside its sovereignty and prior to its law: it comes from else-
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thropological record of "primitive" and tribal warfare indicates that many
non-State cultures have invented highly complex forms of combat that State
armies have adopted or mimicked.65 Plains Indians, Mongolian nomads,
Manuan Polynesians, and the Masai all utilized discipline and command,
speed and surprise, fortification and mobility in their military practices.66
States develop military institutions by appropriating and reigning in the
groups residing within their territories who have already organized them-
selves for warfare. 67 According to Deleuze and Guattari, "[t]he State has no
war machine of its own; it can only appropriate one in the form of a military
institution, one that will continually cause it problems., 68 Ample historical
evidence supports the view that States appropriated pre-existing military in-
stitutions. During the thirteenth century, for-example, European rulers sanc-
tioned non-State violence in the form of privateering.69 States relied on pri-
vate organizations with their own military power to undertake foreign
ventures, such as founding colonies, which States themselves lacked the
revenue to finance. "The [nineteenth century] process by which control over
violence was centralized, monopolized, and made hierarchical entailed not
the state's establishment and defense of a new legal order but the state's im-
posing itself as a defender of that order."7 ° States incorporated or "captured"
the violence of privateers-a form of violence external to the State-and se-
lectively sanctioned it when profitable.7'
Even now, military organizations exist outside of or on the margins of
States. These mercenary organizations assume two main forms. They may
where." Id.; see also PIERRE CLASTRES, SOCIETY AGAINST THE STATE 357 (Robert Hurley
trans., 1977).
65. See HARRY HOLBERT TURNEY-HIGH, PRIMITVE WARFARE: ITS PRACTICE AND
CONCEPTS 26, 39-90, 130, 132 (1991).
66. See id.
67. Charles Tilly, for example, discusses the struggle by States to extract coercive capa-
bilities from individuals and groups within their territory. See Charles Tilly, Reflections on
the History of European State Making, in THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL STATES IN WESTERN
EUROPE, supra note 53, at 38.
68. Deleuze & Guattari, supra note 64, at 355.
69. See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 22-23. Thompson distinguishes between privateers
and pirates, thus: "[T]he former acts under the authority of a state that accepts or is charged
with responsibility for his acts, while the latter acts in his own interests and on his own au-
thority." Id. at 22.
70. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
71. James l's advisors recommended, when considering the establishment of the Vir-
ginia colony, that if the Spaniards complained, the King could blame the London Company:
If it take not success ... it is done by their owne heddes. It is but the attempt of
private gentlemen, the State suffers noe losse, noe disreputation. If it takes suc-
cess, they are your subjects, they doe it for your service, they will lay at your Maj-
esty's feet and intress your Majesty therin.
Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Virginia Under the Stuarts, 1607-1688, in THE SHAPING OF
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 29-30 (1914). Plausible deniability continues to be one of the incentives
for States to sanction the private use of force.
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organize themselves as multinational commercial entities that pursue par-
ticular economic goals or as loose, informally organized bands of adven-
turer-mercenaries that exploit military opportunities as they arise. Both of
these types of organizations are outside the State and may function as a
"war machine," autonomous and unrelated to the State.72
[T]he outside of States cannot be reduced to "foreign policy," that is, to a
set of relations among States. The outside appears simultaneously in two
directions: huge worldwide machines branched out over the entire ecu-
menon at a given moment, which enjoy a large measure of autonomy in
relation to the States (for example, commercial organization of the
"multinational" type, or industrial complexes, or even religious formations
like Christianity, Islam, or certain prophetic or messianic movements,
etc.); but also the local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities, which
continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in opposition to the
organs of State power. What becomes clear is that bands, no less than
worldwide organizations, imply a form irreducible to the State and that
this form of exteriority necessarily presents itself as a diffuse or polymor-
phous war machine.
73
This passage from Deleuze and Guattari describes two types of organiza-
tions which are external to the State: segmentary, marginal bands and multi-
national entities. We examine them in turn.
III. MERCENARY PRACTICE AT THE MARGINS
A. The Adventurer-Mercenary
Loose bands of mercenaries have been common participants in small,
obscure wars since the mid-1960s. These assemblages of adventurer-
mercenaries share a number of common features regardless of national ori-
gin, level of combat experience, or the particular conflicts in which they
fought.
Many of these adventurer-mercenaries experienced disciplinary prob-
lems while serving in State armies. John Banks, who organized the recruit-
ment of mercenaries for Angola in the 1970s, was dishonorably discharged
from the British Army's Parachute Regiment.74 Some of the mercenaries
who served in Angola in the early 1970s had been in prison, and some
joined to escape from the police.75
72. As Deleuze and Guattari write, "the war machine is directed against the State, either
potential States whose formation it wards off in advance, or against actual States whose de-
struction it purposes." Deleuze & Guattari, supra note 64, at 359.
73. Id. at 360.
74. See MOCKLER, supra note 58, at 155. According to Mockler, Banks and his com-
rades "had a dominating prejudice: against the British officer class.., which they both re-
sented and envied." Id.
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Mercenary units often have a weak command structure and disciplinary
problems. Unlike State armies, where the legitimacy of command rests un-
questioningly in the officers, mercenary assemblages are often characterized
by military Darwinism, which requires that commanders prove their
strength. The imposition of military discipline within mercenary units has
generally required violence.76 As Deleuze and Guattari point out, "discipline
is the characteristic required of armies after the State has appropriated them.
The war machine answers to other rules.... [T]hey animate a fundamental
indiscipline of the warrior, a questioning of hierarchy, perpetual blackmail
by abandonment or betrayal, and a very volatile sense of honor....
Where States have "captured" or utilized mercenary violence, this lack of
discipline often causes problems. For example, the Croatian Army dis-
charged its First Dutch Volunteer recon unit because they were rowdy, dis-
orderly, and caused innumerable discipline problems. 78 Looting by merce-
naries has been a consistent problem. One former French Foreign
Legionnaire in Bosnia said, "I've only made about five hundred pounds here
in the last year. Though it has its perks, you know what I mean? You run by
a dead body, know what I mean, and he's wearing a Rolex. What the
f[**]k.- 7 9
While it is commonly believed that mercenaries are motivated by pecu-
niary gain, many mercenaries profess political or ethical motivations. One
American who had formerly served in the Eighty-Second Airborne Division
and Special Forces in Vietnam explained why he volunteered to escort food
supplies to Northern Bosnia: "I am here as an unpaid adviser in both civil
and military affairs. If the Serbians were the ones suffering I would have
gone with them, but it's Moslem families who are being slaughtered, so
they're the ones I came to help." 80 In 1975, mercenaries who had been re-
[W]e was told we was to go to Angola, West Africa, to help train an army of na-
tives whose morale was very low.... I was out of work and things was expensive
in England .... I was wanted by the police for assault in December 1975 and I
was on a £200 sterling bail.
Id. at 72.
76. Perhaps the most horrible example of imposition of discipline in a mercenary unit
occurred in Angola in 1976. A mercenary commander named Callan executed 13 British
mercenaries who were unwilling to fight because they had not been trained for the tasks they
were assigned. See id. at 79-91. They were forced to remove their clothes and were then shot
by their comrades. See id. When other mercenaries in Angola heard of the execution, they in
turn executed one of the men responsible after a summary court martial. See id.
77. Deleuze & Guattari, supra note 64, at 358.
78. See Tom Chittum, Day of the Jackass: Dutch Dirty Dozen Decommissioned in Croa-
tia, SOLDIER FORTUNE, Mar. 1993, at 56.
79. Rob Krott, Achtung Baby: Croatian Troops More Interested in Styling Than Soldier-
ing: Remaining Foreign Mercs Unpredictable, SOLDIER FORTUNE, Aug. 1993, at 33.
80. Peter Douglas, Along Bosnia's Ho Chi Minh Trail: American SF Vet Advises Mos-
lem Freedom Fighters, SOLDIER FORTUNE, Feb. 1993, at 37. Similarly, one 17-year-old
volunteering with the Croatia National Guard said: "I saw some stuff on the news about how
Croatia is fighting for freedom, so I thought I'd come down and see what I could do to help."
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cruited for the Rhodesian independence organization backed out when it be-
came known that they would be fighting against the white Rhodesian gov-
ernment.8 ' Although the pay was substantial, the recruits were unwilling to
fight "white soldiers for a black boss." 2 Both of these examples suggest that
mercenary labor is not fully commodified. On the contrary, sentimentality,
notions of justice, and political values intrude on the pure monetary transac-
tion.
Money, in fact, can hardly serve as the primary motivation for merce-
naries serving in low-budget wars in the Balkans. In Croatia, the King To-
mislav Brigade was willing
to accept additional experienced personnel but they ha[d] to pay their own
way [over] ... and even then there [we]re no guarantees of acceptance.
Making money can't be a prime motivation as the current pay for a ser-
geant is about $30 a month (paid in German currency). It would take sev-
eral years at that wage just to pay the cost of your airfare to Zagreb.8 3
One mercenary had not been paid during his three months in Croatia
even though the expected pay was only equivalent to about £100 (U.S.$160). That's 4,600 Hrvaski dinars per month, which is sufficient to live
where one carton of cigs costs 300 dinars and all public transport for sol-
diers is free .... Anyone who expects big money fighting in Croatia can
forget it.... What kept me there was the character and loyalty of the
Croatians with whom I served. Individually, as people, they are great
guys-but as soldiers, in general, they couldn't fight sleep.84
The International Brigade of the Croatian Army, disbanded in 1993, pro-
vided work for numerous adventurer-mercenaries as long as they had their
own weapons and equipment. 5 Similarly, a Serbian thirty-two-year-old
combat commander who worked in Zaire explained:
I fought for nearly four years in the war, commanded a behind-the-lines
Dogs of War, SOLDIER FORTUNE, Feb. 1992, at 38.
81. See TICKLER, supra note 4, at 69.
82. Id. This is not to suggest that the political views of mercenaries are always so "lib-
eral." One mercenary in the failed coup in the Seychelles volunteered because "the Seychelles
is a Communist tyranny run by Soviets and Marxists and the Libyan regime." Id. at 104.
Some mercenaries have no well-defined political views at all and are astoundingly ignorant
of the political and military activities in which they participate. One mercenary admitted that
"I received $1,000 down payment and never met the person who paid us. But I believe it was
done on behalf of the former President. Mongon? Montson? I am not sure of his name."
MOCKLER, supra note 58, at 263. The first president of the Seychelles after independence,
who was forced on the citizens of the Seychelles in 1976, was James Mancham. See id.
83. Colonel Robert K. Brown, SOF Team Trains the King's Cadre: On the Firing Line
With Bosnia's King Tomislav Brigade, SOLDIER FORTUNE, Apr. 1993, at 38.
84. "Skippy" Hampstead, Bushwacked in the Balkans: International Catch Serbs in
Crossfire, SOLDIER FORTUNE, Aug. 1992, at 37.
85. The International Brigade probably numbered at the most 140 men, with perhaps 40
more of Croatian ancestry. See Krott, supra note 4.
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commando unit and was wounded.... Today I have just enough money
every day for bread, a pack of cigarettes and a drink. I am working for less
than $90 a month for .a man who never fought and became rich as a war
profiteer.
86
While adventurer-mercenaries seek out a provisional existence at the
margins of States, they nevertheless take their professional duties seriously.
Ironically, professional mercenaries in Bosnia often had more military ex-
pertise than the regular army soldiers with whom they fought. Due to lack of
resources and urgent need, the Croatian Army was primarily composed of
new, poorly trained recruits with inferior weapons: "It seems like every ya-
hoo in the country was issued a uniform and a Kalashnikov." 8' The merce-
naries in Bosnia with previous military experience generally found the
Croatian volunteers to be underprepared at best:
First there were the guys who didn't give a toss; ... [Ilit was damn near
impossible to find a Croat who didn't stink of alcohol and wasn't half
wasted. Second, there were men whose main concern was to look
good.... I'd say they watched too much television: armed to the teeth,
grenades hanging from their belts . . . , carrying the biggest knives they
could find, and whatever berets they fancied-instant Para, instant Green
Beret.8
8
This mercenary's description of Croatian regular army soldiers reverses the
stereotype; the mercenaries were the professionals, while the soldiers
seemed to be playing at arms.
This discussion has shown how adventurer-mercenaries sell their mili-
tary labor as a commodity in the world market. Yet, the commodification is
incomplete where mercenaries establish limits on who can purchase their
labor. Many adventurer-mercenaries profess an unwillingness to fight for an
unjust cause; this vestigial sense of honor offends our concept of "merce-
nary" as a kind of prostitute who must sell to any willing buyer in a market.
Their claim to "professionalism" no doubt also strikes one as naive at best.
Nevertheless to accept the State generated perception of mercenaries as
money-hungry, amoral soldiers of fortune who will sell their skills to the
highest bidder, ignores the significance and meaning which mercenaries
claim for themselves outside the ideological system of States on which they
feed.
86. Jonathan C. Randal, Serb Troops Paid to Go to War-In Zaire, WASH. POST, Mar.
19, 1997, at A13.
87. Krott, supra note 4, at 67.
88. Hampstead, supra note 84, at 35.
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B. Multinational Military Corporations
1. South African Corporations
The second form of mercenary organization is the multinational mili-
tary corporations with a purely commercial purpose. Executive Outcomes
(EO), a South African private company, was a mercenary multinational cor-
poration who sold their military labor on an international market.89 During
its existence, EO represented an inversion of the commodity system in at
least two ways. First, they were an autonomous military organization which
usurped the economic and political power of States. Second, EO produced a
convincing counter-ideology which legitimated the alienability of military
labor albeit with certain restrictions.
89. EO closed down on January 1, 1999, apparently in response to the new Republic of
South Africa Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Act],
designed to regulate foreign military activity by its nationals. See Thomas K. Adams, The
New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict, Parameters (visited Sept. 24, 1999)
<http://carlislewww.army.mil/usawc/parameters/99summer/adams.htm.>. Before the passage
of the 1998 Act, the 1957 Defence Act (Act No. 44 of 1957), section 12 1(A) prohibited
members of the SADF, the reserves, or auxiliary members from serving as mercenaries or
providing mercenary services. The Second Amendment to the Penal Code (Act No. 126 of
1992), adopted prior to the promulgation of the new constitution, the 1987 Security Officers
Act, and the National Keypoints Act (Act No. 102 of 1980) also contained provisions appli-
cable to security service companies operating inside South Africa. For example, such compa-
nies were prohibited from using firearms and explosives, training their personnel in certain
types of military or paramilitary operations, etc. Although EO was licensed in South Africa as
a private security company and was not in violation of any South African laws before the
1998 Act was passed, the 1998 Act would have hindered EO' operations. Although the 1998
Act prohibits mercenary activity under section 2, it regulates the rendering of foreign military
assistance either inside or outside of South Africa by requiring authorization from the Na-
tional Conventional Arms Control Committee as constituted by the National Executive by the
decision of August 18, 1995, under sections 4 and 5. Authorization would not be granted un-
der section 7 if, for example, approval would conflict with South Africa's obligations in
terms of international law, infringe on human rights and fundamental freedoms, contribute to
regional instability, or be unacceptable for any other reason. The 1998 Act also gives the
Minister of Defense veto power over the authorization under section 4, subsection 3. Essen-
tially, the 1998 Act would allow the government of South Africa to decide what contracts EO
could accept, thereby exerting State control over private military operations. According to the
financial director of EO, Nico Palm: "African countries are busy working out solutions in Af-
rica. Let's give them a chance. I am going to get involved in other things which keep me out
of the limelight. I am going to close the company and I will not be involved in the security
business." Anton La Guardia, Mercenaries: Executive Dogs of War Have Had Their Day,
ASIA-PAC. NETWORK, Jan. 3, 1999. Ironically, the closure of EO will force governments to
rely more heavily on the free-lance mercenaries once common in Africa. Jakkie Cilliers, Ex-
ecutive Director of the Institute of Security Studies in Johannesburg, said the closure of EO
would change little because its activities were spread through a large network of security
companies, many of them outside South Africa. See La Guardia, supra. Strangely, however,
EO' Pretoria offices remain staffed, and its employees in Sierra Leone have begun working
for a new firm called Lifeguard. See Adams, supra. Former EO employees are reportedly
working for the national government of Angola and the National Union for the Total Inde-
pendence of Angola (UNITA) rebels. See Can Anyone Curb Africa's Dogs of War?,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 16-22, 1999, at 41.
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EO was paid generously by the governments who contracted with
them.' In September 1994, for example, EO was awarded a contract by the
Angolan government for military training worth $40 million.9' Contracts for
security and military training were estimated to be between $20 million to
$100 million per year.92 In addition to direct payments, EO, its parents and
affiliates sometimes received mining and energy concessions from the em-
ploying nation.93 While it was in operation, EO established a stable military
and political environment and then began
to exploit the concessions it ... received by setting up a number of associ-
ates and affiliates which engage[d] in such varying activities as air trans-
port, road building, and import and export, thereby acquiring a significant,
if not hegemonic, presence in the economic life of the country in which it
wa[s] operating ....
EO had a considerable impact on African politics. According to EO'
chief executive, Nic Van Den Bergh, because EO' efforts forced UNITA to
the negotiating table they "changed the balance of power in Angola quite
dramatically .. . ."95 EO certainly improved the domestic political situation
in Angola. "Angola was notorious for its diamond smuggling, weapon
smuggling, ivory smuggling, precious wood smuggling and our presence
there put an end to that."96 According to EO' founder and general manager,
Eben Barlow, "[w]e have had a major impact on Africa. We have brought
90. EO also paid its employees well. EO mercenaries in Sierra Leone earned up to $2000
per week. See Africa-Politics: Among Mercenaries, Mad Mike's Out, Trainers In, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, May 22, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2261211.
91. See Philip Winslow, Why Africa's Armies Open Arms to Elite Fighters From S. Af-
rica, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 19, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, CSM
File.
92. See Lynne Duke, Dogs of War' on a Loose Leash; South Africa Weighs Reining In
Peddlers of Mercenary Ex-Soldiers, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1996, at A22. For governments,
the money was well spent: "Between mid- 1993 and late 1994, EO trained 4000 to 5000 [An-
golan] government troops and [approximately] thirty pilots." Angola: Between War and
Peace: Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses Since the Lusaka Protocol, ARMS PROJECT/
HUM. RTS. WATCH AFR. (Hum. Rts. Watch, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1996, at 17 [hereinafter
HRW Angola Report].
93. Strategic Resources Corporation, a Bahamas-based holding company that controls
EO, also owns part of a company called Branch Mining. See Danielle Gordon, No Peace for
South Africa's Wand'ring Warriors, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, May/June 1996, at 6, avail-
able in 1996 WL 8994334. Branch Mining was awarded diamond-mining concessions as par-
tial payment for its work in Sierra Leone in 1995. See Winslow, supra note 91. Other compa-
nies linked to EO include Branch Energy in Cabinda, Bridge Resources, and Corporate
Trading International. See HRWAngola Report, supra note 92, at 19.
94. Thalif Deen, United Nations: Mercenaries Seek Stake in Diamond Mines, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13588933 (quoting the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Mercenaries Enrique Bernales Ballesteros).
95. Kevin Whitelaw, Have Gun, Will Prop Up Regime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
20, 1997, at 47.
96. Interview of Executive Outcomes' Head Eben Barlow, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Jan. 24, 1997, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, BBCSWB File.
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peace to two countries almost totally destroyed by civil wars." 97
Before a South African Act of Parliament drove EO out of business,
EO' consolidated economic and military power base was beginning to rival
that of the States it once defended and served. If this trend had continued,
"Executive Outcomes w[ould have] become ever richer and more potent,
capable of exercising real power, even to the extent of keeping military re-
gimes in being. If it [had] continue[d] to expand at th[at] ... rate, its influ-
ence in sub-Saharan Africa [w]ould [have] become crucial."9 That a private
multinational mercenary company could amass enough political and eco-
nomic power implies that States, at least some African States, have lost the
monopoly on organized military violence. As the Special Rapporteur on
Mercenaries pointed out in his 1997 Report, EO
rivals a function traditionally assigned to the State, namely, security, not
only that involving police functions, but also national security, which in-
cludes the organization of the armed forces and the maintenance of public
order, the sovereign exercise of the authority of the State and the integrity
of the national territory.99
Where States can no longer control the private violence in their own
territories, alternative military or paramilitary entities will usurp this func-
tion. Numerous mercenary corporations provide private security for compa-
nies doing business in countries where the local security forces cannot guar-
antee the safety of their foreign industrial installations."° These companies
become profitable when the police are either understaffed, incompetent, or
corrupt. In South Africa, for example, more people are now employed by
private security companies than the police force. 0 ' In East Africa, espe-
cially in Angola and Zaire, the security industry is growing at twenty to
twenty-eight percent per year.' 02
This change in military relationship between States and private entities
suggests that some States no longer exert explicit control over military tech-
nology or manpower. Military skill is becoming increasingly privatized and
97. Khareen Pech & David Beresford, Corporate Dogs of War Who Grow Fat Amid the
Anarchy of Africa, OBSERVER, Jan. 19, 1997, at 19, available in 1997 WL 7809257.
98. Id.
99. Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human
Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N.
ESCOR, 53d Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 7, 1 64, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/24 (1997) [herein-
after 1997 Report on the Question of the Use ofMercenaries.
100. Securicor (Great Britain), for example, grew out of a small guarding company
formed in 1935 by the Marquis of Willingdon. See Patrick Tooher, The Changing of the
Guard, INDEP. (London), Mar. 31, 1996, at 6, available in 1996 WL 4066220. Securicor hires
retired police chiefs, ex-military personnel, and financiers. See id. Sir Peter Imber, former
Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police sits on the board of directors. See id.
101. See Micaela Wrong, Fear Drives Africa's Boom Business: Security Companies
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commodified. °3 "Increasingly companies, not nations, own and manage the
crown jewels of the global military industrial enterprise.""'° While the rea-
sons for this change are complex, according to EO' founder,
[t]here has been a scaling down of armies after the Cold War era. A lot of
armies have decided to become leaner and meaner, and often they lose
very valuable skills in going through these processes, and have to contract
people in afterward in order to redress the balance within the armies. I
don't think it's a privatization of war as such, but possibly a privatization
of training.
10 5
Because their entire purpose is to engage in violence, professional mer-
cenaries like EO sometimes prove to be more efficient than the States own
armed forces. According to John Leigh, Sierra Leone's envoy to Washing-
ton, "[t]he government of Sierra Leone believes EO can do a better job
[providing security] than the Sierra Leone army .... Their deployment in
the diamond districts has permitted the resumption of diamond mining in
Sierra Leone " ... 106
In the process of military privatization, EO acquired the skill, knowl-
edge, and manpower that States have lost. States like Angola and Sierra
Leone are once again in the position of having to purchase a commodity
provided by an outside supplier. EO like other military consulting organiza-
tions, acquired this military skill and knowledge by pilfering the human re-
fuse of State armies."0 7 EO personnel included a number of SADF officers
103. Similarly, States no longer fully control the commodity flow of equipment and
technology in the world market. Historically, States exerted political control over the circula-
tion of weapons in the world market through devices such as export controls. Since the end of
the Cold War, however, major arms-producing States "have promoted the export of advanced
weapons and the associated technologies to the developing world." WILLIAM W. KELLER,
ARM IN ARM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GLOBAL ARMS TRADE 9 (1995). The globaliza-
tion of military industry has resulted in the loss of political control over potent weapons. See
id. at 10. Economic forces, rather than calculated political decisions, increasingly determine
the worldwide allocation of weapons. Finished weapons and the technical knowledge neces-
sary to produce weapons are increasingly available to whomever can pay the market price.
104. Id. at 10.
105. Interview of Executive Outcomes' Head Eben Barlow, supra note 96.
106. Whitelaw, supra note 95.
107. Security firms also hire employees with prior military experience. For example,
Keeni Meeni Services (KMS), a private British military-consulting firm, was founded by
David Walker, an ex-Special Air Service (SAS) major, and James Johnson, a former Guards
officer. KMS worked for the Sultan of Oman on a contract worth $12 million and was subse-
quently hired by the Sri Lankan government in their counterinsurgency action against the
Tamils. There is some evidence that KMS was engaged in active combat missions. See
TICKLER, supra note 4, at 127. The KMS team that trained and flew missions for the Contras
in Honduras was led by a former Royal Air Force pilot, Michael Borlace, who had previously
served in the Rhodesian Army during Ian Smith's regime. See id. Jardine Securicor Gurkha
Services (Hong Kong) is run by former British Army Major Chris Hardy and employs over
900 former members of the British Army's Gurkha Regiment. See Keith B. Richburg, Long
Fabled as Military Fighters, Gurkhas Turn to Private Security, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 3, 1995,
at 46. Defense Systems Limited (Great Britain), who specialize in protecting embassies, re-
cruit former Gurkhas and SAS members. See Wrong, supra note 101.
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and non-commissioned officers from the Thirty-First and Thirty-Second
"Buffalo" Battalions and Koevoet (Crowbar) paramilitary police.108 "We
only use people who are South African, or they served in the South African
armed forces, and we have some members who used to be in the ANC's
[African National Congress] military wing as well."'" The founder of EO,
Eben Barlow, was a former member of the South Africa Intelligence Ser-
vice. 10 EO' commander in Sierra Leone was Brigadier Burt Sachs, former
commanding officer of the South African Fifth Reconnaissance Com-
mando."1'
Armies discharge soldiers for a variety of reasons that have nothing to
do with fitness or competence. Many former soldiers
find themselves without a job. They have no other skills. So first of all to
him it's a job. Secondly,... [EO] do[es] offer, I suppose, an excitement
that the army doesn't offer, and the guys do work in foreign countries,
they get exposed to different cultures, they get exposed to different mili-
tary scenarios and all that coming from the background they come from is
very exciting. 112
Private consulting organizations gladly recruit these men, already provided
with excellent military training by States. EO repackaged the skills and re-
sold them to States.
Despite the fact that EO functioned autonomously from States, and in
fact had effectively broken the State's monopoly on the use of organized
violence, EO' military force was incompletely commodified-it could only
be purchased by States: "[W]e are only employed by governments, and gov-
ernments are not going to employ us in order to overthrow them.""..3 EO re-
fused contracts from opposition groups: "Our work has always been with
legitimate governments, under legitimate contracts.""' 4 EO refused work in
the Sudan because it believed the regime supports terrorism.15
EO demonstrated a strange loyalty both to those who hired them and
the international system of States in general. In Sierra Leone, for example,
EO prevented a coup by a group of army officers following the election, and
108. See 1994 Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries, supra note 1, at 18.
109. Interview of Executive Outcomes' Head Eben Barlow, supra note 96. EO was re-
ported to hire former commandos from the British SAS, Selous Scouts from the former Rho-
desia, and military technicians from the Soviet Union. See Duke, supra note 92.
110. See Howard French, S. African Consultants Called Guns for Hire: Contractors
Play Role in Conflicts Abroad, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June I1, 1995, at 38A. Barlow
served as an agent in the Civil Cooperation Bureau of the Thirty-Second Battalion, which
carried out covert operations during the Apartheid Era. See Duke, supra note 92. Barlow
founded EO after seventeen years in the South African Army. See Winslow, supra note 91.
111. See Jim Hooper, Sierra Leone: The War Continues, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REV., Jan.
1996, at 41, available in 1996 WL 9483513.
112. Interview of Executive Outcomes' Head Eben Barlow, supra note 96.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Whitelaw, supra note 95.
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was discreetly thanked by the government and other international organiza-
tions. 116 Where it could have exploited a vulnerable situation, EO backed the
elected government. As one EO executive noted, "[w]e are not going to help
anyone that is not a legitimate government or which poses a threat to South
Africa, or that is involved in activities really frowned upon by the outside
world.""' 7 EO seemed unwilling to incur the approbation of States by par-
ticipating in any "outlawed" activities.
Because of the legal and ideological proscriptions on mercenary work,
EO has denied participating in combat operations." 8 However, in Angola
EO employees flew combat sorties in Soviet Mi-17 helicopters and MiG
fighters" 9 and the town of Soyo was seized in a 1994 operation conducted
by EO. 20 In Sierra Leone, in October 1995, EO helped government troops
to retake four townships in the region from the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF). 121
In 1995, an EO member discussed direct involvement in a military op-
eration in Angola:
A team went ahead to clean up Cafunfo. We followed up later and, on the
way to Cafunfo, we killed about 300 enemy soldiers. Executive Outcomes
was engaged in attacks all the time. It did give some training as well, but
the successes of the MPLA could be directly attributed to Executive Out-
comes' involvement.
122
Barlow acknowledged that EO was involved in military engagements with
UNITA in Angola:1 23 "[W]e were on... [occasion forced] into a position
116. See Hooper, supra note 11:
[D]isgruntled senior RSLMF [Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force] officers
whose illicit diamond trading was threatened by the installation of the new gov-
ernment, began planning a coup.... [T]he conspirators were quietly advised by
the South Africans that they supported the election results and would respond vig-
orously to any attempt to overthrow the government to which they were contrac-
tually bound. The result was that one member of the disbanded junta was posted
abroad for a two-year staff course, the plot evaporated, and EO was discreetly
thanked by various international bodies.
Id.
117. Pech & Beresford, supra note 97.
118. See HRW Angola Report, supra note 92, at 17. Andy Brown, a spokesman for EO
in Freetown, Sierra Leone said that EO had only trained infantry units and that no EO per-
sonnel fought on the ground, although intelligence, logistics, communications, strategic plan-
ning, and operational command were being run by EO. See Sam Kiley, Sierra Leone Faces
Aid Cut Over Apartheid Soldiers, TIMES (London), July 19, 1995, available in 1995 WL
7684870.
119. See HRWAngola Report, supra note 92, at 17.
120. See JANE'S MR. EXERCISE & TRAINING MONITOR, Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 8.
121. See Christo Johnson, Troops Foil Coup in Sierra Leone, INDEP. (London), Oct. 4,
1995, at 15, available in 1995 WL 9813258.
122. HRW Angola Report, supra note 92, 19.
123. In December 1995, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos canceled EO' con-
tract following pressure from the United States in order not to jeopardize the peace process
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where we had to take action to defend ourselves and if threatened, we'd
carry out pre-emptive strikes."'" In characterizing themselves at "trainers"
and "advisors" EO avoided the stigma of being simple mercenaries.
125
To retain their clientele of States, EO disassociated themselves from
"mercenaries" who are sometimes used by States, but always shunned. Ad-
venturer-mercenaries like Bob Denard were objectionable to EO on the
grounds that they were motivated by private, selfish interests and cared little
for the State system: "He [Denard] ... effectively ran the Comoros for a
while until he was ousted .... [P]eople such as him really travel around the
world looking for conflicts, and join armies, and build up their own
army."'2 6 EO seemed proud that although they posed a threat to States, they
provided a service to States. "There is a very distinct line between what we
do and what mercenaries do," says EO' Chief Executive Nic Van Den
Bergh.'27 "We are providing a professional military advising service."'
States were apparently willing to agree with EO' assessment. In No-
vember 1995, the government of Angola issued a statement which asserted
that EO did not fall under the definition of mercenary in the 1989 Interna-
tional Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
with UNITA. EO officially pulled out of Angola in mid-January 1996, although a number of
the men employed by EO may have remained in Angola to work for front companies, such as
Saracen International, Stuart Mills International, and Shibata Security. See Jeff Zerbst, The
World This Week; Tenacious Advisors, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Johannesburg), Dec. 26, 1996,
available in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, AFRNEWS File. Portuguese security companies
employed by the MPLA government, such as Tele Services, may have absorbed some EO
personnel. See Diamond Build-Up for SPE, AFR. ENERGY & MINING, Mar. 27, 1996, avail-
able in LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, AFRNWS File. Mercenaries engaging in active combat
operations are still commonly employed by the Angolan government. In May 1996, the An-
golan Armed Forces (FAA) based in Malange Province were using Katangese mercenaries.
See Angolan Army Chief Gets Advice From Chissano, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 15, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 3854726.
124. Gordon, supra note 93, at 5. Concerning pre-emptive actions taken by EO in Sierra
Leone see Al. J. Venter, Sierra Leone's Mercenary War: Battle for the Diamond Fields, INT'L
DEF. REV., Nov. 1, 1995, at 65, available in 1995 WL 14421808.
125. Security firms also deny any involvement in active combat operations, even when
the evidence clearly indicates their participation. In February 1995, Gurkha Security Guards
(GSG) were subcontracted to train the RSLMF. See Hooper, supra note 11. Although GSG
denied it was involved in combat operations in Sierra Leone, after GSG arrived, government
forces using two Russian Mi-24 helicopter gun ships flown by Belarussian mercenaries at-
tacked a series of rebel bases. On February 24, 1995, the Gurkhas' commander, American
Colonel Bob McKenzie (a Vietnam vet who had worked with the Rhodesian SAS and in
Bosnia) was killed trying to rescue one of Strasser's advisors in an offensive operation. See
Jim Hooper, Rag-Tag Rebel Band Holds a Nation to Ransom: Impoverished Sierra Leone
Must Pay Mercenaries to Fight Its Territories, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 12, 1995,
at 28, available in 1995 WL 7989924. Because of the association of the Gurkhas with the
British army, the British Foreign Office feared that it would be interpreted by the RUF as di-
rect intervention. Nick Bell, the head of GSG stated that the Gurkhas "are not in Sierra Leone
in an offensive role .... Id.
126. Pech & Beresford, supra note 97.
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Mercenaries. 2 9 The government called EO "foreign military and industrial
security specialists" hired on a cooperation basis and argued that the coop-
eration agreements and contracts signed with the Ministry of Defense were
legal and in accordance with Article 15 of Presidential Decree No. 2/93 on
military policy.
13
Despite the fact that EO minimized the threat it posed to States, the
very fact of competent, commodified military skill threatens the State's long
held monopoly on the use of force.' 3' Aziz Pahad, South Africa's Deputy
Foreign Minister expressed this fear perfectly: "[T]oday they're there to de-
fend you, tomorrow those forces will be there to overthrow you."' 13 2 The
South African Government responded to this threat by proposing neutrality
laws and by trying to persuade the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to
condemn EO and other firms to no avail.' 33 EO, however, did not object to
South Africa's proposed legislation restricting foreign enlistment, "[i]n fact,
we [EO] welcomed the legislation when it was initially announced. We...
believe that there will then be some form of regulation."' 34
2. U.S. Corporations
Military Professional Resources, Inc. (USA) (MPRI) is another multi-
national mercenary corporation. MPRI, in fact, claims it is "the greatest
corporate assemblage of military expertise in the world."' 3 5 A number of
high-ranking former U.S. officers are employees of MPRI, including Gen.
Carl E. Vuono, who served as the Army Chief of Staff until 1992 (and was
Colin Powell's mentor), and Gen. Crosby E. ("Butch") Saint, who was the
commander of the U.S. Army in Europe from 1988-1992. MPRI's team in
Croatia was headed by retired two-star U.S. Army General Richard Grif-
fiths. Retired Army Lieutenant General Harry Soyster, formerly the head of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, is MPRI's vice president for international
operations. 1
36
129. See HRWAngola Report, supra note 92, at 18.
130. Id. at 18.
131. According to Human Rights Watch Consultant Alex Vines, EO was not covertly
furthering the foreign policy of any State. See Interview with Alex Vines, Human Rights
Watch Consultant, in Wash. D.C. (June 24, 1996). On the other hand, Greg Mills of the
South African Institute of Intentional Affairs argued that EO may be furthering the foreign
policy aims of South Africa by aiding the government of Angola, a long-term ally. See Duke,
supra note 92.
132. Winslow, supra note 91.
133. See id.
134. Interview of Executive Outcomes' Head Eben Barlow, supra note 96.
135. Mark Thompson, Generals for Hire: Confronted With Its Trickiest Task in Bosnia,
the U.S. Has Made Plans to Pay Someone Else to Do It, TIME MAG., Jan. 15, 1996, at 34
(quoting a MPRI brochure).
136. See Paul Harris, Have Guns Will Travel: Corporate Mercenaries With Links to
Arms Sellers and the Pentagon Are Fulfilling US Policy Aims by Proxy, SCOT. ON SUNDAY,
May 5, 1996, at 15, available in LEXIS, UK Library, SCOTSM File.
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MPRI does business with the American government and with foreign
States. MPRI has annual billing revenues of about $12 million, but expected
a profit of $230,000 in 1995.'3 MPRI holds a number of contracts for the
Department of Defense in areas of training and doctrine development, and
equipment testing and evaluation. 3 '
Because MPRI is outside the State, it can be used for sensitive opera-
tions without jeopardizing the U.S.' neutral status. When the Croatian gov-
ernment sought advice from the United States on how to construct a civil-
ian-controlled army and to provide leadership skills training, the Pentagon
referred the Croatian Defense Minister to MPRI. 1 39 According to a State
Department spokesman, the expertise provided by MPRI was "crucial to
Zagreb's stated goal to avoid excesses or atrocities in military opera-
tions. ' " ° Although MPRI denies conducting offensive operations, the recap-
ture of Krajina in August 1995, utilized typical American operational de-
ployment, including integrated air, artillery, and infantry movements, as
well as the use of maneuver warfighting techniques to destroy Serbian
command and control networks.'' MPRI was also hired by the Bosnian
Muslim-Croat Federation to arm and train the Federation Army. 14 2 In fact,
the United States was instrumental in bringing MPRI and the Muslim-Croat
Federation Army together. In early January, James Pardew from the Penta-
gon went to Sarejevo to urge the Bosnian government to hire MPRI or other
consultants such as Science Applications International (SAIC) to begin
training their army prior to the lifting of the arms embargo. 43
This discussion indicates the benefits that States derive from the con-
tinued existence of mercenary organizations. They provide a convenient
pool of labor that can be tapped when necessary and can be used for politi-
cally sensitive actions that States can plausibly deny. Yet, mercenaries are a
137. See Crock, supra note 5.
138. For example, MPRI field-tested the MI09-A6 Paladin howitzer at Fort Leaven-
worth. See id. MPRI also introduced the M2/M3 Bradley armored fighting vehicles to the Na-
tional Guard. See id. MPRI has also worked in Taiwan and briefed the Swedes on Operation
Desert Storm. See id.
139. See Roger Cohen, U.S. Cooling Ties to Croatia After Winking at Its Buildup, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995, at Al.
140. US Military Consultants Advising Croatians, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Aug. 7, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 7840504. MPRI's activities were approved by the Pentagon, who de-
termined that the training course did not involve tactical training or otherwise violate the
1991 U.N. Security Council arms embargo on Yugoslavia. This embargo made direct military
assistance illegal.
141. Reports indicate that a number of high-level meetings and computer simulations
were conducted in the days immediately preceding the Krajina offensive. See Cohen, supra
note 139.
142. See Barbara Starr, US Firm to Train Muslim Federation in Bosnia, JANE'S DEF.
WKLY., June 5, 1996, at 5, available in 1996 WL 9481406. The total value of the "equip and
train" program is estimated to be $700-800 million. The US has also agreed to provide refur-
bished equipment worth $98.4 million. See Bosnia Chooses Virginia Firm to Train, Equip
Army, REUTERS, May 29, 1996.
143. See Thompson, supra note 24.
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dangerous tool which can be turned against one master as easily as another.
For example, in March 1997, several hundred Serbian mercenaries hired by
Zaire's President Mobutu began firing on the Zairian Army when Kabila's
rebels attacked Kisangani."' States may be able to temporarily "capture"
this violence--control of it may be much more elusive. The following sec-
tion explores the legal mechanisms by which States have attempted to con-
trol the commodification of violence.
IV. LEGAL CONTROLS ON THE COMMODIFICATION OF VIOLENCE
A State's toleration of the buying and selling of military manpower de-
pends on the level of control that States exert. When States do the buying
and selling, tolerance for commodification of military skills is very high.
Employment of foreign citizens in a regular army is a non-prohibited, "ac-
ceptable" commodification of military manpower. The French Foreign Le-
gion, for example, is a standing army composed of multiple nationalities.'45
Similarly, the ruling Al Khalifa family of Bahrain have used foreign secu-
rity officers as police and as internal intelligence agents since the early
1960s. Both the British and the Indian Army recruit Nepalese citizens
(Gurkhas) for service in their standing armies." During the Vietnam War,
the U.S. Army assembled the Fifth Special Forces Group's Civilian Irregu-
lar Defense Group (CIDG), a 50,000 member force primarily composed of
tribal minorities such as the Montagnard. 1'47
State "rental" of another State's troops is another form of non-contested
buying and selling of military manpower."' During the 1969-76 Dhofar War
144. Kabila, who accused the mercenaries of fighting alongside Hutu extremists respon-
sible for the Rwandan genocide, had warned that any mercenaries captured would be exe-
cuted on the spot. See Chris Mcgreal Kinshasa, Zaire's Dogs of War Maul Their Masters,
OBSERVER NEWS PAGE, Mar. 16, 1997, at 22, available in 1997 WL 7811651.
145. For a history of the French Foreign Legion, see TONY GERAGHTY, MARCH OR DIE:
A NEW HISTORY OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION (1986).
146. The British East India Company began recruiting Gurkhas in 1815 and the recruit-
ing continues under the Kathmandu Agreement of 1947. The term "Gurkha" applies to any
Nepali serving in the armed forces. The term comes from the Kingdom of Goorka, a town
west of Kathmandu. For a history, see BANSKOTA PURUSHOTrAM, THE GURKHA CONNECTION:
A HISTORY OF THE GURKHA RECRUITMENT IN THE BRITISH INDIA ARMY (1994).
147. See Colonel David Hackworth, Does Uncle Sam Need a Foreign Legion?, SOLDIER
FORTUNE, Mar. 1994, at 51.
148. States complicit in providing mercenaries generally deny any involvement in the
sale of mercenary talent. In 1997, for example, Serbia and other former Yugoslav republics
supplied arms and mercenaries to Zaire. Although the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry denied any
government involvement in the deals with Zaire, according to one Western diplomat: "The
mercenaries are just the icing on the cake.... The equipment represents the real money for
Belgrade and Pale .. " Randal, supra note 86. Furthermore, the former commander of the
Yugoslav Army's Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement, which handles overseas
weapons sales, General Jovan Cekovic, helped set up a dummy Egyptian tourism company
that arranged refueling and overflight rights for aircraft taking mercenaries and arms to Zaire.
See id.
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in Oman, the British Army asked for volunteers for "loan service" to the
Sultan's forces. 49 The Sultan paid the wages of the loaned soldiers, and the
same amount to the British Army for the expense of training them.,'s Dur-
ing the Vietnam War, the United States purchased the services of South Ko-
rean, Thai, and Philippine troops. 5' The governments of these States were
paid an overseas allowance, an allowance for rank, and a per diem allow-
ance. 2 The United States also paid all expenses associated with deploying
those forces in Vietnam.15 3
The ad hoc purchase of military skill, whether by States or insurgent
groups, is only prohibited when it is not condoned by the States who are
"providing" the labor. This type of mercenary was common during the
1960s and 1970s in Africa. Several hundred French, Belgian, British, and
Rhodesian mercenaries served in the Congo from 1960-1968.'54 Thousands
of mercenaries fought in Rhodesia during the mid-1970s.' 55 In 1969, during
the Nigerian Civil War, hundreds of mercenaries volunteered to fight for se-
cessionist Biafra. 1 6 In 1975, French mercenary Bob Denard toppled Abdal-
lah's regime in the Comores.) 7 In a later coup, Denard reinstated Abdallah
and was rewarded with control of the army and presidential guard, which
were primarily composed of European mercenaries. 58
149. For a discussion on the operation, see MICHAEL DEWAR, BRUSH FIRE WARS: MINOR
CAMPAIGNS OFTHE BRITISH ARMY SINCE 1945, at 165-80 (1984).
150. See TICKLER, supra note 4, at 124.
151. See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 94.
152. See id.
153. See ROBERT M. BLACKBURN, MERCENARIES AND LYNDON JOHNSON'S "MORE
FLAGS": THE HIRING OF KOREAN, FILIPINO, AND THAI SOLDIERS IN THE VIETNAM WAR (1991).
154. For a first-person history of the war in the Congo written by a mercenary com-
mander, see MIKE HOARE, MERCENARY (1984).
155. See WILFRED BURCHETT & DEREK ROEBUCK, THE WHORES OF WAR: MERCENARIES
TODAY (1977); see also MOCKLER, supra note 58, at 154-162 (discussing the recruiting prac-
tices in Great Britain for the war in Rhodesia).
156. Many European mercenaries supported Biafra for humanitarian reasons; none
fought with the Nigerian forces. Count Carl Gustav Von Rosen, a national hero of Finland
who single-handedly bombed Russian positions during the invasion in 1939, assembled a
make-shift airforce for Biafra and successfully attacked Nigerian forces. He said:
[W]hen I understood the Biafrans were a people ... headed by a legal govern-
ment[,]... then I went all out to try and stop this terrible killing of innocent
women and children .... [Ihf you.., have gone to fight for Finland because it
was close to your own country. .. , there is no excuse for backing out of a similar
situation because it is further away and the people are black.
MOCKLER, supra note 58, at 137-38.
157. See id.
158. The Comores became a mercenary paradise. Denard converted to Islam, married a
local woman and went on a hajj to Mecca. See id. at 156. It is widely believed that Denard
murdered Abdallah in 1989, after he threatened to expel the mercenaries. See Lynn Duke,
Dogged Soldier of Fortune Strikes Again, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1995, at A19. After France
deployed 3000 troops to the region, Denard went into exile in South Africa. See id. In 1995,
66-year-old Denard again seized the Comores, suspended the constitution, and declared a
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The commodification of mercenary labor is sometimes prohibited when
States have not given their permission. Under the U.S. Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952,' for example, American citizens who enlisted in the
armed forces of a State without the permission of the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense lose their citizenship.' 6° Foreign enlistment was
permitted only if the executive authorized it.16 1 Similarly, section 4 of the
British Foreign Enlistment Act prohibits British citizens from accepting,
"'without the license of Her Majesty... [,] any commission or engagement
in the military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any foreign
state at peace with Her Majesty .... 162 This alienation of military services
for sale in an open market to the highest bidder is proscribed because it can-
not be controlled by States. Foreign nationals serving in standing State ar-
mies and the leasing of military manpower provoke almost no approbation,
because the State controls the flow of the commodity.
163
military junta. See id. After French paratroopers stormed the island, Denard surrendered. See
id. For an early history of the Comores coups, see MOCKLER, supra note 58, at 236-257. For
later developments, see Duke, supra.
159. Section 1481(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A.
§ 148 1(a)(3) (Lexis L. Pub. 1997) currently reads:
(a) A person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturali-
zation, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any of the follow-
ing acts with the intention or relinquishing United States nationality--
(3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed
forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons
serve as a commissioned or noncommissioned officer ....
Id.
160. Section 148 1(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act formerly provided that
a person could lose their citizenship by "entering, or serving, in, the armed forces of a foreign
state unless, prior to such entry or service, such entry or service is specifically authorized in
writing by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense." In Afroyim v. Rusk, however,
the U.S. Supreme Court found the non-voluntary deprivation of citizenship unconstitutional
on due process grounds, holding that citizenship conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment is
absolutely vested and cannot be forfeited unless an individual makes a specific declaration of
the intent to abandon citizenship in addition to a voluntary commission of an expatriating act
(such as voting in a foreign election or serving in a foreign army). See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253, 267 (1967); see also U.S. v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 261 (1980). According to the
Attorney General, voluntary relinquishment is "not confined to a written renunciation," but
"can also be manifested by other actions declared expatriative under the [A]ct, if such actions
are in derogation of allegiance to this country." 42 Op. Att'y. Gen. 397, 400. While service as
a mercenary alone would not cause the loss of U.S. citizenship, enrollment in foreign military
service in combination with a sworn oath of allegiance might constitute an express waiver of
citizenship. See Taulbee, supra note 20, at 361 n.93. Following the decision in Afroyim v.
Rusk, § 148 1(a)(3) was amended in 1986 by the Ninety-Ninth Congress to include a provi-
sion that nationality could only be lost by "voluntarily performing any of the following acts
with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality .... " Pub. L. No. 99-653,
§ 18(a), 100 Stat. 3655 (emphasis added).
161. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1481(a)(3) (Lexis L. Pub. 1997).
162. Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 90, § 4 (Eng.) (emphasis added).
163. See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 97.
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A. Neutrality Laws: Monopolization of Violence
States first came to control the private deployment of violence in the in-
ternational system through neutrality laws. Neutrality laws, in fact, might be
said to be the highest expression of the State's monopolization of violence
because they give only States the power to make war. Broadly, domestic
neutrality laws restrict the right of individuals to use force in an interna-
tional context by prohibiting enlistment in a foreign military force and re-
cruitment to enlist.
The United States was the first State to codify the rights and duties of a
neutral State,' 64 and the first State to integrate a monopoly on the use of
force into the fundamental constitutional structure. The first U.S. Neutrality
Act, enacted in 1794, outlawed private warfare, and gave the President and
Congress (rather than private citizens) the power to make foreign policy.'65
Under Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution, only Congress has the power
to declare war.' 66 The first Neutrality Act implemented this constitutional
grant of power by criminalizing military activity that violated Article 1. The
Neutrality Act prohibited U.S. citizens from accepting commissions or
enlisting in the service of a foreign State. 67 In order to deter U.S. involve-
ment in foreign conflicts, the Act proscribed individuals from providing or
preparing the means for military expeditions against a State with which the
United States was at peace.' 68
Most States now have some form of neutrality law. Between 1794 and
1938, forty-nine States enacted laws concerning their citizens' foreign mili-
tary service. 6' The Australian Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment)
Act of 1977, for example, prohibits the recruiting, advertising, facilitation,
or promotion of the use of mercenaries to serve in the armed forces of an-
other country. 70 The French Penal Code prohibits any hostile action that
would expose the State to a declaration of war. 17 The Canadian Foreign
Enlistment Act makes it an offense to enlist in the armed forces of "any for-
164. The 1794 Act is generally recognized as the first instance of municipal legislation
in support of the international obligations of neutrality. For a discussion of the history of U.S.
neutrality laws, see U.S. v. Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 52 (1897).
165. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 5, 1 Stat. 381. After the original Neutrality Act was
repealed in 1818, involvement of U.S. citizens in the Spanish Civil War prompted Congress
to pass a second Neutrality Act, which survives in modified form at 18 U.S.C. §§ 958-967.
166. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
167. Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, § 5, 1 Stat. 381. A misdemeanor was committed "if any
citizen of the United States ... within the territory or jurisdiction of the same, accepted and
exercised a commission to serve a foreign prince or state in war by land or sea .... Id.
168. This section of the Act is still in force and is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 960.
169. See THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 81.
170. See Australian Crimes Act, 1977, No. 13 (Austl.). Australian citizens who are re-
cruited outside of Australia, however, are not prohibited from enlisting under the Act. See
L.C. Green, The New Law of Armed Conflict, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 18-19 (1977). An Austra-
lian citizen may recruit mercenaries outside of Australia. See id.
171. See C. PtN. arts. 84,85 (1810) (Fr.).
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eign state at war with any friendly foreign state ... ,, Recruiting is pro-
hibited in Canada for the "armed forces of any foreign state or other armed
forces operating in that state."'73 Although the South African Defense Act of
1957 prevents armed expeditions by private individuals, the government has
failed to restrain the activity of mercenary groups. 174 The proposed 1997
South African legislation is designed to curtail the involvement of South Af-
ricans in mercenary activities by subjecting the sale of military or intelli-
gence services to the same licensing process as military hardware.
75
Neutrality laws share three noteworthy features that serve to illustrate
the State's "strategy" for the monopolization of violence. First, embedded
within neutrality laws is an entrenched notion that the responsibility of
States extends only so far as their territory does. This connection of territory
and violence is at the heart of neutrality laws. Second, neutrality laws do not
distinguish between States and belligerents. It simply does not matter if
mercenaries volunteer to fight for States or insurgents-neutrality laws still
apply. Finally, neutrality laws draw a strange distinction between the condi-
tions of war and peace.
1. Territorial Limitations
Neutrality laws only became possible once violence was "territorial-
ized" in the nineteenth century and States were finally held "accountable for
the transborder coercive activities of individuals residing within their bor-
ders.' 76 During the Napoleonic Wars, for example, the activities of merce-
naries and privateers threatened to draw the United States into the war. 177
Mercenary recruitment within the borders of a State was seen as an attack
on sovereignty itself. Thomas Jefferson argued that "the granting of military
commissions, within the United States, by any other authority than their
own, is an infringement on their sovereignty, and particularly so when
granted to their own citizens, to lead them to commit acts contrary to the du-
ties they owe their own country ." 78
In 1896, the U.S. Supreme Court determined in Wiborg v. United
States,179 that an overt act must occur within U.S. territory for the Neutrality
172. Foreign Enlistment Act, R.S.C., ch. F-29, § 4 (1970) (Can.).
173. Id. § 11(1). Presumably, this would criminalize enlistment in national liberation
movements fighting within a State territory.
174. The South African government supported UNITA in Angola, which for a number
of years was heavily recruiting South African mercenaries. See Al J. Venter, Merc Market
Booming on Dark Continent, SOLDIER FORTUNE, Dec. 1993, at 60.
175. See Pech & Beresford, supra note 97.
176. THOMPSON, supra note 24, at 19.
177. See id. at 77.
178. Id. at 77. By the nineteenth century, citizens owed political loyalty and military
duty to their country. No longer was military skill a commodity to be bought and sold in an
international market.
179. 163 U.S. 632 (1896).
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Act to apply. 8 ' The Court held that the Act did not prohibit voluntary en-
listment in a foreign army or the conduct of private hostile acts against a
foreign State by U.S. citizens abroad. 181 Because the Act did not prevent in-
dividuals from leaving the United States to enlist in a foreign army, the Act
did not prevent mercenary activity per se, but only the actions that occurred
within the territory of the United States.' 82 The current U.S. neutrality law,
the Foreign Relations Act, prevents acts carried out within U.S. territory for
the purpose of enlisting in a foreign military force,'8 3 but was held by the
Supreme Court not apply to individuals who leave the United States to enlist
in a foreign army.' 8'
Mercenary activities occurring outside U.S. jurisdiction thus do not vio-
late U.S. law.'85 Except in rare cases, the United States does not exert juris-
dictional claims over the extra-territorial conduct of its citizens.' 86 Unlike
French criminal law, which applies to all citizens at home or abroad, crimi-
nal behavior of U.S. citizens abroad is generally not punishable under U.S.
180. See id. at 655-56.
181. See id. at 653.
182. Within U.S. borders, individuals have no right to bear arms and form private armies
under the Second Amendment. See Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 210 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that the Second Amendment does not
imply an individual right to establish private armies and to bear arms); U.S. v. Hale, 978 F.2d
1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 997 (1993) (stating that "we cannot con-
clude that the Second Amendment protects the individual possession of military weapons.").
Private armies formed in the United States, with no intention of entering military service
overseas, are not constitutionally protected and may be liable to prosecution under anti-
militia laws.
183. 18 U.S.C.A. § 959(a) (Law. Co-op. 1996) provides:
Whoever, within the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains an-
other to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the jurisdiction of the United
States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince,
state, colony, district, or people as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board any
vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall be fined under this title or im-
prisoned not more than three years, or both.
Id.; see also U.S. v. Nunez, 82 F. 599 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896).
184. See U.S. v. O'Brien, 75 F. 900 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896).
185. See Gayon v. McCarthy, 252 U.S. 171 (1920) (affirming the conviction of a Mexi-
can national who recruited U.S. citizens to fight for the Mexican revolutionaries); U.S. v.
Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 52 (1897); see also Robert E. Cesner, Jr. & John W. Brant, Law of
the Mercenary: An International Dilemma, 6 CAP. U. L REV. 339, 358 (1977).
186. U.S. citizens who commit the crimes of treason, income tax evasion, and draft eva-
sion, however, are liable to U.S. laws by virtue of their U.S. citizenship. See LOUIS HENKIN ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 445 (1980). National security may also ne-
cessitate extra-territorial jurisdiction. In Haig v. Agee, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the
executive has the power to restrict an individual from undertaking international travel when
the purpose of the travel is likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign
policy of the U.S. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). For a general overview, see Jenni-
fer Myers, Passport Controls: Revocation of Passports for National Security Reasons, 23
HARV. INT'L L.J. 163 (1982). For an argument that mercenaries could be restricted from leav-
ing the country on these grounds, see Note, American Mercenaries and the Neutrality Act:
Shortening the Leash on the Dogs of War, 12 J. LEG. 175, 188-94 (1985).
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law. In United States v. Dane,'87 for example, Dane, a British national, had
pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of illegal firearms in a U.S. court.'88
After serving his sentence, Dane was given probation.'89 While on proba-
tion, Dane handled weapons, had his personal weapons shipped to Mexico
from the United States, and engaged in armed insurrection in Rhodesia."9
Although the court characterized this as evidence of a return to mercenary
life justifying revocation of probation, the court noted that the acts them-
selves were not in violation of U.S. laws: "[T]he acts cited by the court...
were committed outside the United States and violated no law of the United
States."' 9 '
2. Applying Neutrality Laws to Insurgents
The second element of neutrality laws which exposes the State's strat-
egy for monopolization of force is the application of neutrality laws to in-
surgents. Through neutrality laws, the United States monopolized private
violence deployed on behalf of States, and private violence deployed on be-
half of insurgents. In United States v. Nunez, 92 a New York court held that
the purpose of section 959 of the Neutrality Act, which prohibits foreign
enlistment, was "to prevent entanglements between th[e U.S.] government
and foreign powers, by prohibiting expeditions from this country interfering
with belligerents, or with the relations between a mother country and its in-
surgent people.... "'93
The United States need not recognize the belligerent status of the politi-
cal entity in order for the Act to apply; actual conflict triggers application of
the Act. In the United States v. Three Friends,'94 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a Spanish colony not recognized by the United States nevertheless
had the status of a belligerent nation. 95 The Court had been
informed of the existence of an actual conflict of arms in resistance of the
authority of a government with which the United States are on terms of
peace and amity, although acknowledgment of the insurgents as belliger-
ents by the political department has not taken place; and it cannot be
doubted that, this being so, the act in question is applicable.
196




191. Id. at 845.
192. 82 F. 599 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1896).
193. Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
194. 166 U.S. 1 (1897).
195. See id. at 65-66.
196. Id. at 65-66.
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Similarly, in the Santissima Trinidad,'97 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
a state of civil war between Spain and her colonies:
Each party is therefore, deemed by us a belligerent nation, having, so far
as concerns us, the sovereign right of war, and entitled to be respected in
the exercise of those rights. We cannot interfere to the prejudice of either
belligerent, without making ourselves a party to the contest, and departing
from the posture of neutrality.19
8
Conditions of actual conflict apparently confer belligerent status and trigger
the application of neutrality laws.'
99
3. War and Peace
The third noteworthy element of U.S. neutrality laws is the distinction
made between war and peace. Historically, the United States prohibited al-
most every instance of planning or financing of a military expedition or en-
terprise against a foreign State, colony, or people under 18 U.S.C. § 960
with whom the United States was "at peace."2 Receiving a commission in
a foreign army with whom the United States was "at peace" was also pro-
hibited under 18 U.S.C. § 958.21 This law applies whenever there is no ac-
tual armed conflict between the United States and a foreign State. When
there is war between the United States and a foreign State, mercenaries are
immune from prosecution. In United States v. Elliott,2"2 which concerned a
197. 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 336 (1882).
198. Id. at 337.
199. The U.S. recognition of the belligerent status of insurgents reflects an expansive
view of the power of non-State entities to make war. These cases also draw on a U.S. legal
doctrine by which actual conditions of conflict, rather than declarations of war, confer bellig-
erent status. See Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862) (U.S. Confederacy treated
as a belligerent even though the Union had not declared war).
200. 18 U.S.C.A. § 960 (Law. Co-op. 1996) provides:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides
or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or
naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or
dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with
whom the United States is at peace, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both.
Id.
201. 18 U.S.C.A. 958 (Law. Co-op. 1996) provides:
Any citizen of the United States who, within the jurisdiction thereof, accepts and
exercises a commission to serve a foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people,
in war, against any prince, state, colony, district, or people, with whom the United
States is at peace, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than
three years, or both.
Id.
202. 266 F. Supp. 318 (D.N.Y. 1967).
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conspiracy to destroy a railroad bridge in the Republic of Zambia, the U.S.
district court held that the statute applied because the United States was "at
peace" with Zambia.2 3 On the other hand, in "situations such as North
Vietnam or the Bay of Pigs... government complicity would effectively
bar prosecution.
' 204
The ambivalent character of recent low-intensity operations-which are
neither war nor peace but something in between-has changed how "at
peace" can be interpreted. Where any covert operations are occurring, courts
are unlikely to find that the United States is "at peace" in that region. Sec-
tions 956(b), 958, and 960, therefore, cannot be applied. In United States v.
Terrell, 205 for example, defendants were charged with shipping and trans-
porting weapons to the Nicaraguan Contras.' The U.S. district court held
that the United States was not "at peace" with Nicaragua and dismissed the
indictment.2 7 The court found that declarations of war had become pass6
"in these modem times of covert activities and undeclared warfare. ' 28 The
court rejected the contention that the United States was "at peace" with
Nicaragua after Congress passed the Boland III Amendment" 9 in October
203. Id. at 322. Through 18 U.S.C. §. 956(b), the United States reserves the power to
punish conspiracy to destroy the property of a foreign State. Section 18 U.S.C.A. § 956(b)
(Lexis L. Pub. Supp. 1999) provides:
Whoever, within the jurisdiction of the United States, conspires with one or more
persons, regardless of where such other person or persons are located, to damage
or destroy specific property situated within a foreign country and belonging to a
foreign government or any political subdivision thereof with which the United
States is at peace, or any railroad, canal, bridge, airport, airfield, or other public
utility, public conveyance, or public structure, or any religious, educational, or
cultural property so situated, shall, if any of the conspirators commits an act
within the jurisdiction of the United States to effect any object of the conspiracy,
be imprisoned not more than 25 years.
Id. Conspiracy raises an interesting problem because although the conspiracy may take place
in the United States, the result of the conspiracy might be overseas. In Elliott, the district
court found that the United States has "the power to prosecute conspirators for an agreement
made within its borders even though the substantive offense is without its jurisdiction." Elli-
ott, 266 F. Supp. at 323.
204. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. at 324; see also U.S. v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967).
205. 731 F. Supp. 473, 475 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
206. See id. at 473-74.
207. See id. at 477.
208. Id. at 476.
209. The Boland Amendments were public laws enacted by Congress during the 1980s
that denied military and eventually direct economic and intelligence aid to the CIA-sponsored
anti-Sandinista Contras whose goal was the reversal of the "Marxist" anti-Somosa 1979 revo-
lution in Nicaragua. The Boland Amendments were riders to Department of Defense Appro-
priation Acts. Boland I became law on December 21, 1982 and delimited the military appro-
priations budget of fiscal year 1983 as follows:
None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence
Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military
training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individ-
ual ... for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua ....
34
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1984, because the "facts also show that the Contras, funded in part by the
executive branch, continued their attempt to overthrow the Sandinista gov-
ernment."2 ' While this legal interpretation would seem to suggest an excep-
tion to the State's monopoly on the use of force, in sensitive low-intensity
operations the State has no need to fully occupy the killing field. Nominally
private front organizations are sometimes better for covert operations where
the State risks losing political legitimacy if its involvement became known.
Thus, when the United States is engaged in covert operations overseas, mer-
cenaries can act with impunity.21" ' The interpretation of U.S. neutrality laws
offered in Terrell indicates that not just a war, but any armed conflict what-
soever is sufficient to block prosecution of mercenaries. Again, actual con-
ditions of conflict rather than political declarations dictate application of the
law.
This brief discussion illustrates how States have not only maintained a
monopoly on the use of force, but have harnessed the illegitimate use of
force by individuals, and managed to remain blameless. These laws restrict
acts of individuals, but do not limit the State's participation in the interna-
tional military market. Neutrality laws do not prevent individuals from leav-
ing U.S. territory to enlist in a foreign army-thus, mercenary activity per
se is not prohibited. Nor do these neutrality laws target the behavior of pro-
pounding States (i.e., the buying and selling of military manpower). These
laws do prevent States from being held responsible for individual acts of
citizens, and simultaneously allows a shadow market for violence to exist.
Because States have not proscribed their own behavior vis-A-vis the buying
and selling of military manpower the market continues to flourish, but does
so outside of the State system. It is therefore hardly surprising that although
Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793,
96 Stat. 1833, 1865 (1982). Boland I remained in effect until November 1983. Boland II lim-
ited Contra funding to $24 dollars. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-215, § 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (1983); Department of Defense Appropria-
tions Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-212, § 775, 97 Stat. 1421, 1452 (1983). The
Boland II Amendment limited Congressional funding to the Contras until October 1, 1984. In
1984 it was publicly disclosed that the CIA had been involved in mining Nicaraguan harbors,
which caused a strong loss of support for the Contras in Congress. As a result, Congress
passed Boland III, which cut off all aid to the Contras:
During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States in-
volved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or
which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or pa-
ramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement,
or individual.
Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat.
1837, 1935 (1985). During the period when Boland III was in effect, Lt. Col. Oliver North
"privatized" aid to the Contras. See Terrell, 731 F. Supp. at 475.
210. Terrell, 731 F. Supp. at 476.
211. Courts will bend over backwards to admit exonerating evidence under § 960 prose-
cutions. See Casey v. U.S. 413 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1029 (1969).
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the Foreign Relations Act remains viable law, it has not been used to prose-
cute mercenaries from the United States.212 The United States, in fact, has
not only failed to prosecute, but has protested the treatment of U.S. merce-
naries in foreign courts.
213
Domestic neutrality laws, which are an expression of the State's mo-
nopoly on violence, restrict the unauthorized participation of individuals in
the international military marketplace. International law, on the other hand,
regulates the military marketplace by clearly demarcating the commodity to
be regulated (defining who is a mercenary), and by providing disincentives
to would-be mercenaries (no combatant status). In international law, merce-
naries are defined by their financial motivation for acts of war. The stress on
pecuniary rewards as the motivating factor shows that States are concerned
in particular with the mercenary market. The following discussion chroni-
cles the various conventions, protocols, and customary international law
dealing with mercenaries.
B. International Response to Mercenaries
1. Treaty-Based International Law
The 1972 Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimina-
tion of Mercenaries in Africa 214 was the first convention prohibiting merce-
naries and was intended to control the use of mercenaries by insurgent
groups and coup-makers. It did not prohibit States from hiring mercenaries.
Mercenaries were defined only as those men who sold their services to a
"person, group or organization" engaged in insurgency against a State. 5 By
212. Similarly, no prosecutions have been brought under the British Foreign Enlistment
Act of 1870 in over 100 years. Although the Act remains in force, it is ambiguous and out-
dated. See Peter Morris, The Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870: When Will It Be Abolished?, 130
SOLIC. J. 271 (1986).
213. Remarking on the execution of U.S. mercenaries in Angola in 1976, Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger stated that
[t]here is absolutely no basis in national or international law for the action now
taken by the Angolan authorities. The "law" under which Mr. Gearhart was exe-
cuted was nothing more than an internal ordinance of the MPLA... issued in
1966, when the MPLA was only one of many guerrilla groups operating in An-
gola. Furthermore, no evidence whatsoever was presented during the trial of Mr.
Gearhart in Luanda that he had even fired a shot during the few days that he was
in Angola before his capture.
Neutrality and Nonbelligerency: Mercenaries, 1976 DIGEST § 4, at 714.
214. Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in
Africa, O.A.U. Doc. CM/433/Rev. L., Annex 1 (1972) [hereinafter OAU Convention].
215. Article I defined mercenaries as any non-nationals employed by
a person, group or organization whose aim is: (a) to overthrow by force of arms or
by any other means the government of the Member State of the Organization of
African Unity; (b) to undermine the independence, territorial integrity or normal
working of the institutions of the said State; (c) to block by any means the activi-
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permitting their own use of mercenaries, while controlling circulation
among non-State actors, States established a pool of legitimate purchasers
of military manpower.
The OAU Convention also allowed States to continue to monopolize
the market for alienable military skills. E" 6 Under the Convention, mercenar-
ism can only be committed by States or individual actors who have the "aim
of opposing by armed violence a process of self-determination, stability or
the territorial integrity of another State. . ". .- 211 Signatory States, therefore,
could continue to use mercenaries as they see fit as long as they did not vio-
late another State's territorial integrity or interfere in self-determination.
Again, this Convention limits the legitimate consumers of mercenary man-
power to those States that do not oppose self-determination. Insurgent
groups or White governments opposing Black self-determination would thus
be prohibited from using mercenaries.
The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) does not prohibit the use of mercenaries by States or other enti-
ties.218 Protocol I is unusual because it does not regulate the international
military market, or restrict consumption to certain categories of consumers.
Rather, Protocol I simply deprives mercenaries of the status as participants
in armed conflict, and denies protections afforded to other combatants. Un-
der Protocol I, "[a] mercenary shall not have the fight to be a combatant or a
prisoner of war. ' 219 Article 47, section 1 of Protocol I is counter to the gen-
eral thrust of international humanitarian law to extend protection to as many
civilians and combatants as possible.220
Why does the subject of mercenaries cause international jurisprudence
to regress by restricting the application of international humanitarian law?
ties of any liberation movement recognized by the Organization of African Unity.
Id. art. I.
216. OAU Convention, O.A.U. Doc. CM1817 (XXIX) Annex I1 Rev. 3 (1977). This
Convention has been in force since 1985 when it was ratified by 17 signatories: Benin,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sudan,
Tunisia, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Zaire, and Zambia.
217. Id. art. 1, § 2.
218. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protcol I), art. 47(1), adopted June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I]. For additional commen-
tary, see Green, supra note 169.
219. Protocol I, supra note 218, art. 47(1). The United States has declined to ratify Pro-
tocol I. Although the document containing the specific objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
to the ratification of Protocol I remains classified, unclassified sources suggest that the Proto-
col's definition of mercenaries was objectionable. See Howard S. Levie, The 1977 Protocol I
and the United States, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 469, 480 (1993-94); see also Abraham D. Sofaer,
Agora: The U.S. Decision Not to Ratify Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions on the Protec-
tion of War Victims, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1988).
220. See Edward Kwakwa, The Current Status of Mercenaries in the Law of Armed
Conflict, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 67, 88-89 (1990).
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In Protocol I, States are "outlawing" mercenaries, literally putting them out-
side of the international legal system. Denial of combatant status has serious
and deadly consequences, including execution.221 By engaging in a prohib-
ited commodification, mercenaries violate international military and social
norms, and are therefore not extended the protection of the State system that
they both challenge and violate. However, the Protocol I definition is so re-
strictive that almost no one will fall into the category.22 2 One military histo-
rian remarked that, "any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this
definition deserves to be shot-and his lawyer with him!1223 Because Proto-
col I provides the most comprehensive and widely accepted definition of
"'mercenary,,'2 ' and illuminates the State perception of who can be classi-
fied as a "mercenary," it is examined here in detail.
Protocol I is targeted at a very particular type of mercenary. Financial
motivation is at the heart of the Protocol I definition. Article 47, section 2(c)
requires that mercenaries be motivated by private gain.2" Mercenaries mo-
tivated by ideology are outside the ambit of the Protocol.226 Section 2(c)
also requires that mercenaries be paid substantially more than ordinary sol-
221. Of course, most soldiers with any combat experience whatsoever are quick to point
out that the laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions, are in their entirety, pure non-
sense. In practice, a law is only as good as its enforceability, and what legal regime actually
exists to enforce the laws of war? To many soldiers, the laws of war are merely an aspira-
tional dream of liberal jurists who know not of what they legislate.
222. Under article 47(2), a mercenary is any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take direct part in the hostilities; (c) is motivated to take part in
the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by
or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in ex-
cess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the
armed forces of that Party; (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a
resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; (e) is not a member of the
armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and (f) has not been sent by a State which
is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.
Protocol I, supra note 218, art. 47(2). Protocol I applies to international armed conflict. Yet
as the Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries pointed out, mercenaries are most often found in
non-international armed conflicts. Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a
Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-
Determination, U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 28-29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/14 (1988).
223. GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 375 n.83 (1980).
224. The U.K. referred to it as "[t]he only internationally agreed definition of who is a
mercenary .... 37 U.N. SCOR, 2359th mtg., para. 29, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2359 (1982).
225. Protocol I, supra note 217, art. 47 (2)(c).
226. See XV Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 4th Sess.,
para. 21, at 193, Doc CCH/III/SR.57 (1977). The 1976 British government's Diplock Report
on the recruitment of mercenaries pointed out, "[m]ercenaries, we think, can only be defined
by reference to what they do, and not by reference to why they do it." Report of the Commit-
tee of Privy Counsellors Appointed to Inquire Into the Recruitment of Mercenaries, Cmnd.
6569, 1 7 (Aug. 1976).
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diers.227 This requirement distinguishes mercenaries from volunteers who
presumably would accept the pay of an ordinary soldier out of an ideologi-
cal commitment.22 By requiring under article 47, section 2(a) that persons
be "specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed con-
flict," volunteers who join a foreign army on a permanent basis (i.e., French
Foreign Legion, International Brigade), or those who enter a foreign army
by arrangement of their home nation are excluded. 229 Article 47, section 2(f)
requires that mercenaries voluntarily enlist on their own account and not on
behalf of a third State,23° thereby preventing those soldiers sent by their own
governments from being considered as mercenaries.
Active combatant status is also required under article 47 of Protocol I.
Section 2(b) requires that mercenaries take direct part in the hostilities.'
Article 47, section 2 of Protocol I "excludes mere advisers by requiring that
to be a mercenary, one must in fact take a direct part in hostilities, that is,
become a combatant [sic], albeit an illegitimate one."232 Experts who do not
take direct part in combat are regarded as civilians under international
law,233 although liberation movements may regard such military advisors as
combatants. 234 Of course, advances in remote-operated weaponry capabili-
ties may make it more difficult to identify which combatants are taking "di-
rect" part in the hostilities.
The Protocol I definition of mercenaries also requires that a mercenary
be disconnected from any State. A mercenary cannot be a member of the
armed forces of a party to a conflict under section 2(e). 235 The Special Rap-
porteur on Mercenaries has pointed out that
[i]n some cases, legal devices are used to... make the mercenary appear
to be a national of the country in whose armed conflict he is involved. Al-
though the use of a device of this type conceals the actual status of the
mercenary, the origin of the contractual relationship, payment, the type of
services agreed upon, the simultaneous use of other nationalities and pass-
ports, etc.[,] must serve as a means of establishing the true nationality of
227. See Protocol I, supra note 218, art. 47(2)(c).
228. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949,
at 479-80 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
229. Protocol I, supra note 218, art. 47(2)(c).
230. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 228, at 581.
231. Protocol I, supra note 218, art. 47(2)(b). Article 47(2)(b) states that a mercenary is
any person who "does, in fact, take a direct part in hostilities[.]" Id.
232. XV Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Devel-
opment of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 4th Sess., para.
25, at 454, Doc. CDDH/407/Rev. I (1977).
233. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 228, at 579.
234. Polisario intended that the French technicians captured in Mauritania be treated as
mercenaries. Le Polisario Traite en 'Mercenaires' les Techniciens Francais de Mauritanie,
LE MONDE, May 24-25, 1977, at 1, cited in Green, supra note 22, at 243.
235. Protocol I, supra note 218, art. 47(2)(e). Article 47(2)(e) states that a mercenary is
any person who "is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict[.]"
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the persons involved in an armed conflict ... 236
A mercenary need only enlist in the armed forces of a party to the conflict to
escape liability. Alternatively, States using mercenaries can declare the
mercenaries to be members of their armed forces. The Croatian Army, for
example, commissioned a number of foreign mercenaries as officers.
237
Croatia's official position was that its military units did not include merce-
naries, but volunteers of Croatian origin or descendants of Croatian immi-
grants, who by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis should be regarded as
Croats.23 s
The 1989 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Fi-
nancing and Training of Mercenaries,239 which is not yet in force,' pro-
vides another example of the attempt by the State system to restrict the in-
ternational mercenary market. Like other conventions and protocols, this
convention focuses on the financial motivation of mercenaries. Article 1,
section 1(b) requires that mercenaries be
motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict,
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to
combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of thatparty[.] 241
236. 1994 Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries, supra note 1, at 14.
237. At the end of 1991, Eduardo Roses Flores, a Spanish ex-joumalist, was commis-
sioned as Commander-in-Chief of the First International Company of Croatia. See 1994 Re-
port on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries, supra note 1, at 26. This brigade operated in
the Osijec operations zone and was composed of former French Foreign Legionairres and
other mercenaries. See id. It allegedly operated on its own in the region of Eastern Slavonia
and committed massacres against Serbian civilians in the villages of Divos, Ernestinovo, Ten-
jski Antunovac and others. See id.; see also KEITH CORY-JONES, WAR DoGs 76 (1996).
238. See Communication from Mr. Mate Granic, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Dep-
uty Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia, to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Mercenar-
ies, (Aug., 26 1993), cited in 1994 Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries, supra
note 1, at 25.
239. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of
Mercenaries, G.A. Res. A/44/34, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 144, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/44/34 (1989), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 89 [hereinafter Convention Against Merce-
naries].
240. Ten States are currently parties to the Convention Against Mercenaries: Barbados,
Cyprus, Maldives, Seychelles, Surinam, Togo, and Ukraine ratified the convention soon after
it was adopted by the U.N. United Nations Treaty Collection (visited Nov. 1, 1999)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/t52/newfiles/part-boo/xviiiboo/xviii-6.htmrl#refiNA I
9aOLAA>. Cameroon, Georgia, and Italy are the most recent parties to the convention. See
id. Sixteen States have signed but not yet ratified the Convention: Angola, Belarus, the
Congo, Germany, Morocco, Nigeria, Romania, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. See id.
241. Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 239, art. 1(1). While the Convention's
definition is similar to the Protocol I definition, the Convention also includes in the definition
of mercenary those persons who participate "in a concerted act of violence aimed at...
[o]verthrowing a government or otherwise undermining the constitutional order of a State or
undermining the territorial integrity of a State." id. This constitutes a tacit recognition that the
40
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 30, No. 1 [1999], Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol30/iss1/10
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY OF MERCENARY VIOLENCE
2. Customary International Law
Customary international law, like treaty-based international law, re-
stricts the circulation of military labor as a commodity in an international
market through a prohibition on recruiting of mercenaries within neutral
States. Under customary international law, nations have a duty to prohibit
the initiation of hostile expeditions by persons within their territory against
other nations.242 States have a duty to protect the rights of other States
within their dominions;" they are required to use due diligence to prevent
the commission of criminal acts against other States or peoples. 2" Article 4
of the Hague Convention of 1907 on the Rights and Duties of Neutral Pow-
ers and Persons in War on Land245 provides that "corps of combatants can-
not be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral
power to assist the belligerents." 246
Customary international law focuses on the threat posed by organized
groups of mercenaries rather than individuals. While unorganized armed
volunteers pose no serious threat to the sovereignty of States,247 autonomous
military organizations threaten the State's monopoly on military violence.'
market for mercenary services includes not only States but insurgent organizations.
242. See M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE ACTS OF
PRIVATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES 49-53, 61-66 (1962); Note, Nonenforcement of
the Neutrality Act: International law and Foreign Policy Powers Under the Constitution, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1955 (1982); Jules Lobel, The Rise and Decline of the Neutrality Act: Sover-
eignty and Congressional War Powers in United States Foreign Policy, 24 HARV. INT'L L.J.
1, 64 (1983).
243. See Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l. Arb. Awards 829 (1928).
Some legal scholars have argued that States which fail to prevent harmful acts against other
States, such as mercenary activity, violate the international obligation to deter aggression and
preserve order. See Garcia-Mora, supra note 242, at 109; see also Roy Emerson Curtis, The
Law of Hostile Military Expeditions as Applied by the United States, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 36
(1914) ("If the sovereign has knowingly suffered the harm to be done to another State, it may
be said to be an accomplice in the act itself.").
244. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 88 (Sept. 7). Where
the State lacks the authority to prevent the excursions of private armies into neighboring
States, however, the State cannot be held responsible. See Lobel, supra note 242, at 66 n.336;
see also Richard A. Falk, The Beirut Raid and the International Law of Retaliation, 63 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 415 (1969).
245. Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons on
Land, adopted Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 231, T.S. No. 540 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
246. Id. art. 4.
247. See Hinds, supra note 20, at 414.
248. In his most recent report, the Special Rapporteur on Mercenaries also shows a
heightened concern about how the use of mercenaries is impacting the sovereignty of States:
Can it be that the mercenaries' behaviour is changing so profoundly that they now
constitute the rank and file of the personnel recruited by private companies to con-
tract with African Governments to provide internal security services, safeguard
public order and even put an end to internal armed conflicts? If such contracts are,
indeed, being concluded, the Governments signing them must be doing so on the
basis of a sovereign decision; but is not responsibility for a country's internal or-
der and security an inalienable obligation that a State fulfills through its police and
1999]
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Article 6 of the Hague Convention states that "the responsibility of the neu-
tral power is not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the frontier sepa-
rately to offer their services to one of the belligerents." 9 A State's obliga-
tion to prevent these acts only incurs when they are committed by organized
groups.250 In Nicaragua v. United States,25 the International Court of Jus-
tice ruled that a nation will be found to have engaged in the use of force
against another nation by "organizing or encouraging the organization of ir-
regular forces.., for incursion into the territory of another State." 25
2
Domestic neutrality laws work to establish a State monopoly on vio-
lence by limiting the acts of individuals to territories outside of State
boundaries. Simultaneously, by not regulating their own purchasing behav-
ior, States allow a black-market in military manpower to exist, which States
can then exploit when necessary. International law, on the other hand,
serves to regulate the military market by restricting who can purchase and
consume black-market military labor and by defining who exactly is a mer-
cenary. All of these laws entail certain preconceptions about the socio-legal
universe; they presuppose the territorialization of violence, they enjoin indi-
viduals from making certain market choices and they reserve violence to the
State.
CONCLUSION
Treaty-based and customary international law is a cultural artifact in
which the political ambitions of States are embedded. The desire to mo-
nopolize the deployment of military force and to exercise control over mili-
tary resources resulted in the construction of an aspirational legal regime
that reflects a nineteenth-century nationalist military ideology of duty,
honor, and obedience. The legal regime prevents the complete commodifi-
cation of military skill by structuring various guidelines about when and
how military skill and labor can circulate.
armed forces? Is it not a grave infringement of that State's sovereignty to hand
over such responsibilities to companies registered in third countries which sell se-
curity services staffed by foreigners, presumably mercenaries? Who will be re-
sponsible for any repressive excesses that the security companies may commit
against the civilian population, especially where representatives of the political
opposition are concerned? Who will take responsibility for any violations of inter-
national humanitarian law or human rights they may commit?
1997 Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries, supra note 99, 93.
249. Hague Convention, supra note 245, art. 6.
250. See I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE 292-93 (8th ed. 1955); Layeb,
supra note 20, at 269.
251. 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (merits).
252. Id. at 18 (quoting United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV)); see
also id. at 101-23, 126-27, 146-47. For a full discussion of international law and covert war-
fare, see Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten
Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035 (1986).
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Margaret Radin argues that incomplete commodification occurs most in
those things related to human beings' homes, work, food, sexuality, and po-
litical life. Such "pervasive incomplete commodification is related to appro-
priate ideals of personhood and community. .. .,,23 This article has ex-
plored the way in which military life is conceived in terms of political
community and service, which is antithetical to the world of capital and
business. The persistent rhetoric of inalienability of military skills reinforces
an idea that military force is something that does not circulate and has no
commodity value. Yet, as we have seen, military skills actually do circulate
in a number of different types of markets. Neutrality laws and customary in-
ternational laws provide regulation for the exchange system in military skill.
These types of "[r]egulated markets represent incomplete commodifica-
tion . ..",3"
Why is military violence incompletely commodified? The anti-market
rhetoric surrounding the military in general conceals the way in which kill-
ing and death themselves are commodities. The nonalienability of military
skill also keeps violence anchored to the State-the State's preservation of
an illusion of a monopoly on force provides assurance that there is not a war
machine. It fundamentally denies the existence of military organizations
that exist outside the State.
Radin argues that if sex were openly commodified, sexual discourse
would reflect this commodification and actual lived experience would be
changed. The market would render an understanding of Women in terms of
sexual dollar value and it would make the ideal of nonmonetized sharing
impossible.255 Similarly, if military skill were openly commodified, the
market would render an understanding of soldiers in terms of military dollar
value. It would make the ideal of nonmonetized death impossible. A world
in which violence and death are bought and sold is an empty and cold place.
Why not unleash market forces onto our discourse and very conceptions of
prostitution and mercenaries? By preserving a discourse of nonalienablity of
military skill, we preserve the illusion that the State controls war, and that a
soldier's death cannot be bought.
253. Radin, supra note 23, at 113.
254. Id. at 116.
255. See id. at 133.
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